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Welcome to The Histories. As a student run academic journal, The Histories seeks 
to highlight the historical research that is being conducted by the students of La Salle 
University. In addition, this publication seeks to further expand historical awareness both 
here on campus and in the LaSallian community at large. In the succeeding pages, 
therefore, you, the reader, will find a set of essays which are of high-quality and first-rate 
scholarship.
The historical topics covered in this issue are wide-ranging. Among the four 
articles contained herein, there is an intriguing assessment of the involvement of baseball 
legend, “Shoeless Joe” Jackson in the fix of the 1919 World Series, an in depth 
comparison of three different works on the topic of World War II, a detailed examination 
of Dean Acheson’s role in the formation of American foreign policy from 1947 to 1950, 
and finally, an overview of the Women’s Christian Temperance Movement and its impact 
on American culture.
My sincere thanks to several people who have helped this journal come to print. 
First, to our moderator, Dr. Lisa Jarvinen, as well as the chair of the History Department, 
Dr. Stuart Leibiger, and all of the exceptional faculty members of the History Department 
for their unwavering support of this journal and the Historical Society as a whole.
Second, to the talented writers who contributed their papers to this edition. Next, to all of 
the dedicated members of the Historical Society. And last but certainly not least, we are 
grateful to Chris Kazmierczak for providing us with the financial assistance necessary to 
get this journal published.
In parting, I would like to say that I have thoroughly enjoyed my time as Editor 
of this journal. The job was challenging at times, but the end product always made the 
hard work worthwhile. I know that this publication will continue to thrive in the hands of 
its newest Editor, Lauren De Angelis, in whom I have the utmost confidence.
I do hope you, the reader, find this edition of The Histories to be both an 
informative and pleasant experience. Have a wonderful summer!
Victoria L. Valusek
Editor-in-Chief 
Spring 2010
Writers: Paul Orzechowski, Kevin Prendergast, Victoria Valusek, and Julia
Walsh
Moderators: Dr. Lisa Jarvinen and Dr. Stuart Leibiger
*The picture on the front cover is o f the Schuylkill River on a beautiful day in May 1968.
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I
Shoeless Joe Jackson 
and the 1919 World Series 
By Paul Orzechowski ‘10
The greatest legend in baseball history is considered by most to be Babe Ruth. It 
is fitting that Ruth modeled his swing off the only player who is as much a legend as 
himself. Much like “The Babe,” this man is known to history by a nickname: “Shoeless” 
Joe Jackson. Ironically, the pure swing of this baseball outlaw helped create the savior of 
baseball, Babe Ruth. In recent years, Jackson has become one of the most interesting and 
written about players in baseball history. His story is characterized by myths and 
undisclosed truths, ranging from the origin of his nickname, “Shoeless Joe” to the oft 
quoted child’s request“Say it ain’t so Joe!” (regarding Jackson’s involvement in the 
Black Sox Scandal). These myths serve as testimony to his legendary status in the history 
of the game of baseball.
The questions surrounding Jackson’s involvement in the fix of the 1919 World 
Series are often answered differently based upon little more than assumptions. He is often 
defended by adoring fans. They believe, for different reasons, that he was unjustly 
banned from baseball. Some claim that other prominent baseball figures, such as the 
White Sox owner Charles Comiskey and American League President Ban Johnson, are 
just as responsible yet, find themselves in the Hall of Fame. Still others believe that 
Jackson is completely innocent of being involved in the fix, simply a victim of the 
situation, too dim to know what he signed up for or deny he signed up at all. The truth 
lies somewhere in between Jackson’s innocence and Comiskey’s guilt. The quest for 
these answers begins with his poor childhood which was, like most in the 1890s, filled 
with work instead of school and play.
Deep in the back country of northwestern South Carolina, in Pickens County, Joe 
Jackson was bom to George and Martha Jackson on July 16, 1888.
1 Here he was raised on his family’s sharecropper farm until hard times hit. In 
1894, Joe’s father moved the family to the new mill town of Brandon Mills. At the age of 
six, Joe went to work with his father in the cotton mills where he would soon pick up 
baseball and start his illustrious career.
Joe was paid between 25 and 50 cents per day while his father received the adult 
wage of $1.25 per day. By the age of thirteen, Joe began playing on the mill’s baseball 
team. Teams were used by the mills as an activity to bring communities closer together as
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well as to keep workers content. The mill owners certainly believed that this worked in 
view of the fact that they paid their players $2.50 per game. This was twice the payment 
for an entire day of work in the factory.
Joe earned a starting spot almost immediately as a pitcher, but he would not be 
used in that position for long. One day he threw a ball so hard he hit and broke the arm of 
a batter. After this incident, no one would bat against him and he pitched infrequently for 
the rest of his career. His talents eventually found their way to the outfield where he 
could focus on his tremendous natural hitting ability. For several more years, Joe would 
play ball for different mills, chasing after the best payment offered and quickly becoming 
noticed by pro and semi pro scouts. In 1908, the manager of the class D Greenville 
Spinners and former professional player, Tom Stouch, offered Jackson seventy-five 
dollars per month to play for his team, twice what he was getting at the mill.2
It was in Greenville where Joe’s professional career started and where he would 
eventually earn his famous nickname. He demanded immediate attention through his first 
game which included a double, triple, and home run. Later that year, while playing a 
game in the outfield, his new shoes began giving his feet trouble in the form of severe 
blisters and searing pain. Once at bat, he took off his shoes and stepped to the plate. He 
drove a triple to the outfield and when he pulled into third base a fan yelled, “You 
Shoeless Son of a Gun you!” The nickname stuck for the rest of his life even though he 
never again played without shoes.3
On August 22 of the same year, the Philadelphia Athletics announced that they 
had purchased Joe Jackson’s contract from the Spinners for $325. He joined the team 
after the Spinner’s season ended.4 His time in Philadelphia was filled with bitterness and 
hostility between the veteran players and himself. After two years of trying to fit him in, 
Connie Mack traded him to the Cleveland Naps. In Cleveland, Joe and his wife Katie 
settled in comfortably for five years. He hit .408 in his rookie season, becoming the first 
player to hit .400 as a rookie. The fans quickly fell in love with both his hitting and 
fielding. After five years of success in Cleveland, he was traded to Chicago where he 
would find similar success, but also the demise of his baseball career.
After Comiskey purchased Joe’s contract for $65,000, it seemed he had no money 
to pay his players. He was the stingiest owner in the league and regularly denied players 
much deserved raises. Somehow the public did not see this side of him and nicknamed 
him “the Noblest Roman of Them All.”5 In 1919, Detroit’s Ty Cobb was the highest paid 
player in the league at $20,000, while Tris Speaker was second at $16,000. The entire 
White Sox payroll topped just $85,000. Joe Jackson, with one of the best swings in the 
game, was getting paid just $6,000, and his teammate and participator in the eventual fix, 
Eddie Cicotte, received only $5,000. Cicotte won 28 games the year before and deserved 
twice what he was paid.6 He was offered a $10,000 bonus for winning thirty games in 
1917, but after he won his 29th game, he was benched on the pretense that he needed rest 
for the World Series. As a result of Comiskey’s contractual comer cutting, Cicottte 
became an integral contributor to the eventual fix.
In the off season, owners throughout the league agreed to lower salaries for fear 
that attendance would not rebound after World War I. This quickly proved unnecessary 
as attendance was soaring especially in Chicago. Comiskey stayed the most loyal to 
keeping salaries down even though he was making the most money at the turnstiles. 
Knowing this, the players threatened to strike in July 1919 unless their salaries were
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readjusted to that of the rest of the league. Using his relationship with the players, 
manager Gleason was able to temporarily cool the situation down. Comiskey’s niggardly 
treatment of his players became a major factor in why the fix would ever be formulated 
and how it was able to be carried out.
Another contributing factor to the fix was that the pitching had suffered injuries 
late in the season. As a result, the team would be using only three starting pitchers in the 
playoffs. This made such a fix easy because the conspirators only needed to involve the 
first two pitchers and a few of the regular hitters. Eventually, it was revealed that the fix 
actually involved eight players (though two of them did nothing for the fix other than 
simply having their names associated).
Arnold “Chick” Gandil planned the idea for the fix during the season because of 
his discontent over the lack of financial rewards. Not only did he intend to receive the 
money he felt was owed to him, but he also wanted to cause Comsikey the financial 
damage he felt had been done to him. He met with his associate, Joseph “Sport” Sullivan, 
on the night of September 10, 1919, in his hotel room. Sullivan was a financially savvy 
gambler who seemed to be able to get rich off anyone. He was the associate of Arnold 
Rothstein. Gandil proposed the idea of fixing the World Series by involving enough 
players to do so, but few enough to keep it secretive. In return for the fix, Gandil 
demanded $80,000. Sullivan coolly considered the offer, but was somewhat worried 
about the magnitude of the scheme. He left the hotel without giving an answer.
Another group of gamblers was led by Abe Attell and included Sleepy Bill Bums 
and Billy Maharg. Though this group was separate, Abe Attell still worked with 
Rothstein. Burns convinced Attell to ask Rothstein for the $100,000 that the players 
demanded in return for throwing the series. Rothstein refused at first, but later joined the 
cause and took over the operation. Though many more gamblers gained knowledge of the 
fix, they were only marginally involved. Between the two major gambling groups, it was 
eventually agreed the players would be paid $80,000 for the fix, but only $10,000 was 
paid up front.
Even before the meeting with the gamblers, Gandil had been recruiting for the 
fix. His first target was the much underpaid and subsequently upset Eddie Cicotte.
Cicotte was first introduced to the idea in July after the players threatened to strike. 
Although he was interested, he refused to do so. It took weeks of Gandil’s nagging him 
with the money to persuade him. He agreed to the fix if he was paid $10,000 before the 
series began. The next players to get involved would be shortstop “Swede” Risberg and 
utility infielder Fred McMullin, (the latter only because he overheard Gandil proposing 
the idea to the former).
To make the fix possible, Gandil needed another pitcher who would pitch two or 
three games in the series. He found this pitcher in Claude “Lefty” Williams, who was 
also skeptical of the plan but eventually convinced by Gandil’s continuous offers of 
money. Though the fix may have been able to go on with only the two pitchers, Risberg, 
and Williams, gamblers demanded more names for security purposes. Thus, Gandil spoke 
with “Buck” Weaver, ‘Shoeless” Joe Jackson, and Oscar “Happy” Felsch (the third, 
fourth, and fifth hitters on the team). Joe Jackson was the only one to refuse the idea 
when he was approached by Gandil and offered $10,000. The other two agreed and the 
seven involved players met at Gandil’s hotel room on the night of September 21st. At this 
first meeting, the player lightheartedly joked about the series as they formulated their
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Despite Jackson’s refusal to be involved in the fix, Gandil used his name with the 
gamblers anyway. Upon his second meeting, Gandil, offering $20,000, told Jackson “You
might as well say yes, or play ball or do anything you want,” i.e., the fix would go on 
with or without him. After this conversation, Gandil left Jackson alone, and chose to use 
Joe’s name regardless of his answer.
With rumors flying and gamblers from around the country knowing about the fix, 
money was pouring in on the Reds and Jackson began to worry about the fix being kept 
from the spotlight. The night before the series, he decided to visit Comiskey and tell him 
the story about the fix: “I went to Mr. Comiskey and begged him to take me out of the 
lineup... If there was something going on I knew the bench would be the safest place, but 
he wouldn’t listen to me.”9 He told Comiskey to state that Jackson was suspended for 
drinking or some other behavioral issue. However, Comiskey refused, saying Jackson 
was too good of a player to lose. He calmed Jackson down by pointing to the fact that 
such rumors flew around every year. (It must be noted that Jackson likely had little to 
offer Comiskey by way of details regarding the fix because he had not been present for 
any meetings nor heard any details of the scheme).10
Since he knew he could come under scrutiny by Comiskey or others if the fix ever 
leaked, Jackson played with more intensity and less fun than he ever did before. This 
resulted in setting the World Series record of 12 hits11 in route to a .365 batting average 
with six runs batted in and five runs scored. His resulting tremendous performance in the 
Series is blamed once again by those opposing Jackson on his assumed stupidity. They 
say he could not control his natural ability, that it was simply instinct. An additional 
argument, parallel to the former, was the idea that Joe could get a hit when he chose and 
chose only to hit when it would not help the team. Though this is proven false when the 
timing of the hits is considered, Jackson got several key hits which led to wins. Many 
people point out that these hits occurred after the team was playing to win. This may be 
true, but it was difficult to get RBI’s when the hitters in the lineup ahead of him were not 
playing to win. Similarly, it was difficult to score runs when hitters behind him were not 
playing to win.
The series began in Cincinnati on a hot October 1st. To show that the fix was on, 
Cicotte hit the first batter he faced, Morrie Rath, with the second pitch. He would give up 
a run after Rath scored on Jake Daubert’s single coupled with Heinie Groh’s sacrifice fly 
to Jackson. Joe Jackson scored to tie it for the White Sox on Gandil’s single. Gandil was 
thrown out stretching it into a double. The fourth inning proved more fateful as Cicotte 
gave up five runs. Questionable plays in the inning included a failed attempt at a double 
play by Risberg and a ball he was unable to get to behind his head. The game ended 9-1 
with Jackson, Felsch and Gandil making the final three outs of the game. After the 
surprise game one loss, Gleason, Schalk, and other uninvolved players were fuming at the 
performance of the team.
Gleason continued to hear rumors of the fix and received many telegrams from 
angry fans expressing their concern. He showed them to Comiskey and explained his 
concern. With the National League president John A. Heydler, Comiskey approached 
American League President Ban Johnson with the news and telegrams. Though once 
friends, Comiskey and Johnson were no longer on speaking terms. The grudge was 
reflected in Johnson’s thoughtless response, “What Comiskey says is like the crying of a
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whipped cur.”12 As a result, Comiskey went to bed without answers. Comiskey would 
later use this to put the blame on Johnson. “I blame Ban Johnson for allowing this series 
to continue. If ever a League President blundered in a crisis, Ban did.”13
Since Johnson did nothing the series continued. Lefty Williams started the second 
game determined to blow the game without looking as bad as Cicotte had. He started off 
by getting to the bottom of the fourth inning scoreless. However, in the fourth, the usually 
well controlled Williams seemed to lose control of his pitches and of the game. With the 
rabid fans screaming and Schalk and Gleason visibly upset at Williams, he was unable to 
gain control until the Reds scored three runs on three walks and two hits in the inning. 
This was very uncharacteristic of Williams who usually thrived on pinpoint control and 
the ability to put the ball where he wanted. The White Sox went on to lose the game 4-2 
even though they out hit the Reds ten to four. Williams had succeeded - looking brilliant 
while doing it, but nevertheless losing a close game. Joe Jackson had three hits in the 
game, helping the White Sox score their two runs.14
Although the gambler Abe Attel had made thousands, he coughed up only 
$10,000 to be split up amongst the players. The players had blown two games for the 
gamblers and received only a fourth of the money promised to them by this point. They 
were upset and Gandil told the gamblers that the players had met and decided to continue 
the series as it had gone. In reality, no such meeting between the players had taken place. 
No one knew what was going to happen considering the starting pitcher was not involved 
in the fix. For game three,Gleason sent the rookie, Little Dickie Kerr, to the mound. He 
was a good rookie pitcher,but no one expected him to pitch a shutout in the Sox 3-0 
victory. Gandil knocked Jackson in from third for the first run of the game, the only run 
that would be needed. The loss upset the gamblers and dealt a devastating blow to some 
of them.
Sleepy Bill Burns had bet his fortunes on the game and lost it all. In a meeting 
after the game, Gandil demanded the money, but Burns refused to pay before the next 
game because of what had happened to him in game three. The meeting ended with Bums 
believing the fix was off. However, the next day, Sullivan was able to convince Gandil to 
go on with the fix by promising $20,000 immediately and another $20,000 before game 
five even though he had no intention of following through with the second payment.15 
Despite the lack of trust between the team and the gamblers, the fix was back on when 
Cicotte took the mound in Chicago for game four.
Cicotte handled the Reds through the first four innings, putting them down 
scoreless. In the fifth inning, Duncan hit a ball back to Cicotte who rushed the play and 
threw wildly to first, allowing Duncan to reach second. The following play was even 
more suspicious. Kopf lined a single to Jackson in left field. Jackson made a perfect 
throw, but the ball was for some reason deflected by Cicotte as he tried to cut it off. The 
ball rolled behind home plate and Duncan scored. The two mishaps by Cicotte were all 
that was needed as the game ended 2-0. The excitement from the rookie Dickie Kerr’s 
performance had all but evaporated for the Chicago fans and Gleason.
The fifth game was a rain out, giving Gleason the option of skipping Williams in 
the rotation in favor of the rookie, but he opted not to and instead, put his trust in 
Williams. Williams took to the mound knowing that he was on a short leash with Gleason 
suspecting. He pitched four hitless innings to start the game, but in the sixth Eller lead off 
with a triple, poorly played by the Sox defense. A single and sacrifice put a man on
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second with a run in. Roush lofted a fly ball into center field where Felsch misplayed the 
ball and then dropped it while attempting to handle it. When the ball finally made it 
home, Schalk dove at the sliding runner just missing him. The three runs were enough for 
the Reds to easily win with Hod Eller pitching like Cy Young.16
The following day in Cincinnati, Sullivan failed to show up with the promised 
cash. Thus, Gandil and the rest of the involved players decided the fix was off. They 
would try to win the series and lose the gamblers’ big money. The sixth game of the 
series began with errors abound for the now competitively playing White Sox. Quickly 
they were down 4-0 and it seemed to be another repeat performance. But in the sixth 
inning, the offense finally exploded, scoring three runs to tie the score. Gandil knocked in 
the game winning run in the ninth inning and Dickie Kerr finished the game for the win.
The day after the win the club house’s mood lightened. Gleason trusted Cicotte to 
win the all important seventh game. Cicotte delivered as he completed the game in less 
than 100 minutes winning 4-1. The game was highlighted by poor defensive play by the 
Reds. The uninspired Reds’ crowd of only 13,923 fans did not help the mood or
17performance of the team.
The two past wins were not part of the plan and angered the gamblers. Rothstein 
became very unnerved at the thought of the series going to nine games. He’d known from 
the start that there were too many people involved with the fix and now his worst fears 
were coming true. Rothstein calmly met with Sullivan, making him aware of his fears and 
warning Sullivan that the series had better not go nine games. Sullivan needed to 
communicate this to the starter Lefty Williams immediately. Though it was not his style, 
Sullivan was forced to threaten Williams and his family to be sure the game would be 
lost. He knew a man Harry F. from Chicago, “who was skilled in the finer arts of 
persuasion.”18 Though he demanded $500, Harry promised that Williams would receive 
the message.
Before the game, Kid Gleason lectured his team, “ The minute I think anyone of 
you ain’t playing ball to win-if I think you’re laying down-I’m gonna pull you out even if 
I have to make an infielder out of a bullpen catcher! I’m gonna tell you this, too: I would 
use an iron on any sonovabitch who would sell out this ball club!”19 Unfortunately for 
Gleason, Williams had already been threatened by Harry F., a threat taken much more 
seriously. With him and his wife’s lives on the line, Williams would not last even one 
inning. After getting the leadoff hitter out, Williams allowed four straight hits and three 
runs in just fifteen pitches. Bill James relieved him and with the help of the rest of the 
bullpen proceeded to give up seven more runs. The White Sox went quietly until the 
eighth inning when they rallied to score four runs. It was too late and the game would end 
10-5, bringing the series to a close.
That night in Jackson’s hotel room, he was offered $5,000 in an envelope by a 
drunken Lefty Williams. Williams explained to him that they had told the gamblers that 
Jackson would play to lose. Williams felt Jackson had been betrayed and thought Jackson 
should receive a share. Jackson was upset his name had been used without his 
knowledge. Jackson argued with Williams and informed him that he would tell Comiskey 
the following day. Williams threw the envelope to the ground and Jackson was forced 
to accept it, but he intended to give it to Comiskey.
With the series over, the cover up by Comiskey and other members of baseball’s 
leadership began. The day after the series, Joe Jackson went back to Comiskey, this time
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with proof and more details of the fix than before (e.g., the envelope containing $5,000). 
However, Comiskey’s secretary sent Jackson home and told him that Comiskey would 
write to him if anything further arose, but Jackson never heard back from him. Comiskey 
was already being informed of the fix by Chick Gandil and Happy Felsch.21 Gambler, 
Harry Redmon, who had lost money on the series, was willing to provide information if 
he would be compensated. Comiskey made it worth his while to hear the details from a 
gambler even though he was not directly involved in the fix.22
Although he had all the knowledge he needed, Comiskey offered a $20,000 
reward to anyone willing to provide concrete information about the fix. As far as anyone 
else knew, he had no further knowledge beyond the well circulated rumors. This made 
him appear eager to find the truth, without being forced to turn in his team and lose all 
the value the players offered. Comiskey hired a private detective to investigate the 
suspected players as well as other teams that may have corrupt players. He could use this 
knowledge against any other team that attempted to accuse the White Sox or himself.23
The player’s award for being on the losing team of the World Series was 
supposed to be $3,000. Comiskey held this check from the eight players who had their 
names involved. When Jackson did not receive his check, he sent Comiskey a letter, 
informing him of the missing check and requesting it be sent to him. Comiskey’s 
response questioned the integrity of Jackson’s play during the series and offered to pay 
expenses for a trip back to Chicago to clear his name. Jackson responded by citing his 
performance as proof that he was not involved and thus, he accepted Comiskey’s offer. 
Yet, Jackson did not hear from Comiskey after that because Comiskey did not want to 
hear Jackson’s testimony. Instead, Comiskey sent Henry Grabiner to Jackson to negotiate 
a new contract for the following year.
Grabiner convinced Jackson to sign a contract without having his wife Katie read 
it. Grabiner threatened him with their knowledge of the fix and pressured him into 
signing it even though it was only $8,000 and Joe wanted $10,000. Jackson had 
demanded that the Ten Day Clause, which allowed a team to hold pay of a player after 
ten days of being injured, be left out of the contract. Mysteriously, when Grabiner read 
the contract to Jackson the clause did not exist, but after it was signed the clause 
appeared. Jackson was taken advantage of yet again.24
At the end of the 1920 season, the 1919 Series fix reemerged in national news. 
The rapidly spreading knowledge of the fix led gambler Billy Maharg to tell the story of 
the fix to Comiskey in hopes for the now only $10,000 reward. The reward was never 
received and he incriminated himself and the other gamblers, including Rothstein, Bill 
Bums, and Abe Attell.
Now that it was inevitable that the fix would be brought to public knowledge, 
Comiskey made his move. Before the grand jury indictment, and “for the good of the 
public as he claimed,” Comiskey suspended all eight players whose names were 
mentioned in the fix, “even though it costs Chicago the pennant.”25 He began to work 
with his lawyer Alfred Austrian, to incriminate his players and make him appear as the 
owner who gave up his team for the integrity of the game. Comiskey relied on Austrian 
to find the players who would admit first in the grand jury investigation. The first player 
to be encouraged to confess to the jury was a frightened Eddie Cicotee. He was advised 
to confess and show his sorrow for hurting Comiskey because the jury would appreciate 
it more. Cicotee assumed that since he was a White sox player and Austrian was the
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White Sox lawyer, Austrian was his lawyer. This was a false assumption. Austrian was 
Comiskey’s lawyer and was not looking out for the interest of Cicotee.
While confessing, Cicotee mentioned Joe Jackson as being involved in the fix. 
Upon hearing this, Jackson went straight to Comiskey to get help in clearing his name. 
Unfortunately, he fell right into the trap. When he went to see Comiskey, the only person 
to be found was Austrian. Austrian used his position as “The White Sox lawyer” to 
convince Jackson not to tell the true story which would prove Comiskey knew about the 
fix during the Series. Austrian gave the same advice he gave to Cicotee, i.e., to explain 
that he was involved and act sympathetic. Austrian told Jackson the truth would appear 
weak since his name had already been linked by the gambler Maharg and Cicotee. So 
under the advice of “his” lawyer Jackson admitted his guilt in the fix.
A very confused Jackson told both stories of the fix to the court. When questioned 
by the grand jury he denied being involved in the ring or doing anything to throw any 
game of the series, but when asked by the District Attorney in front of the Grand Jury,
Q: How much did he say he would pay you?
A: Twenty thousand dollars, if I would take part.
Q: And you said you would?
A: Yes, sir.
He repeatedly added statements to the end of his answers such as, “I tried to win 
all the time” or “I was ashamed of myself.” These conflicting statements confused what
Austrian had told him to do with his own story because he also wanted to clear his
26name.
When Jackson was leaving the court room, the myth of “Say it ain’t so, Joe” was 
originated. The story claims that a child asked Jackson this question and that he 
responded by confirming it was true. However, this story was later denied by Jackson 
who claimed no one talked to him except the officers leading him out. Despite this, the 
question became immortalized -  an intricate part of the “Shoeless” Joe Jackson legend.27
The eight members involved in the fix were indicted by the grand jury at the end 
of September. Less than two months later, Judge Kenisaw Mountain Landis was named 
the first commissioner of the Major Leagues. Once in office, he threatened all eight 
involved players: There is absolutely no chance for any of them to creep back into 
organized baseball. They will be and remain outlaws... it is sure that the guilt of some of 
them at least will be proved.” The day after the grand jury found them not guilty,
Landis permanently put the eight players on the ineligible list.
Between September and February, when the players were supposed to go back on 
trial, the courts got mixed up. There was a new district attorney and some of the attorneys 
from the prosecution side now were on the defense side, making for a confusing situation. 
As a result, the new District Attorney determined that the original indictments were 
faulty. With the old indictments, testimony, and immunity waivers thrown out, the new 
trial began in June 1921. The trial did not include Fred McMullin who was acquitted for 
lack of evidence, but the other seven newly indicted players and ten gamblers stood 
against the court.
The players now had their own lawyers looking out for their interest. This resulted 
in Jackson telling a story contrary to what he had said the previous time in court. He told
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the true story, proving his innocence and condemning Comiskey’s knowledge of the fix. 
The gamblers story corroborated with Joe’s innocence. Their stories confirmed Gandil’s 
initiation of the fix with no mention of Jackson being involved. Despite this, the judge 
asked for five year jail sentences and $2,000 fines for all involved, but the jury found 
them innocent of all charges. Despite this ruling, Landis made use of his unquestioned
29power by banning all seven players from baseball:
Regardless of the verdict of juries, no player that throws a ball game; no player 
that undertakes or promises to throw a ball game; no player that sits in a 
conference with a bunch of crooked players and gamblers where the ways and the 
means of throwing games are planned and discussed and does not promptly tell 
his club about it, will ever play professional baseball.30
However it must be noted that this statement when applied to the case of Joe Jackson 
does not result in grounds for expulsion. Jackson does not meet any of the criteria set out 
by Landis for expulsion from baseball. Jackson never threw a game, promised to throw a 
game, nor sat in a conference with the others involved in the fix. Once he learned of the 
fix, he immediately went to Comiskey to inform him. Unfortunately, his lack of 
knowledge of the fix and Comiskey’s corruption lead Comiskey to simply ignore the 
information.
Jackson was a necessary victim for Comiskey’s cover up. Under false 
presumptions, Comiskey’s lawyer, Austrian, convinced Jackson to admit guilt to the 
court. This admission and the $5,000 which Comiskey refused to meet with Jackson 
about became the two integral pieces of evidence used to prove Jackson’s guilt. Upon 
close review, the evidence of Jackson’s involvement in the fix of the 1919 World Series 
can be linked back to Comiskey. Jackson has remained a scapegoat for the situation by 
the leaders of baseball to keep the Hall of Famers, Charles Comiskey and Ban Johnson 
image clean. Used by the involved players and by Comiskey in his plan to cover up the 
fix, Jackson never gave up on baseball. He remained in love with the game and played in 
mill towns and on barnstorming teams until he was forty five. Although he always 
wanted to have his name cleared, he was not bitter about the situation and led a 
successful life after baseball, owning a liquor store and making more money than he 
would have in baseball.
Since his death in 1951, Joe’s story has been continuously studied by scholars and 
fans alike. Each time it is, new intricacies and details are revealed that prove Jackson’s 
innocence at the expense of Charles Comiskey. Comiskey began the confusion of 
Jackson’s tale over eighty years ago, but Jackson’s story has been converted to a 
legendary one due to the different stories resulting from the complexity of his story. With 
each new story in the media such as the 1989 film “Field of Dreams” “Shoeless” Joe 
Jackson’s legend grows. This fictional story coupled with the false myths previously 
discussed, enhance the legend that Comiskey created to protect himself, over eighty years 
ago.
1 Jackson’s year o f birth is often disputed, read on his tombstone to be 1888, but on his death certificate as 
1889. Some use the year 1887 as well. Birth certificates were not required at that time in the small town he 
was bom
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2 David Fleitz, Shoeless The life and times o f Joe Jackson,(Mcfarland and Company, 2001) p. 12
3 “This is the Truth”, Joe Jackson, http://www.blackbetsy.com/jjtruth.htm
4 Harvey Frommer, Shoeless Joe and Ragtime Baseball, (Taylor Publishing, 1994)
5 Ibid p. 86
6 David Fleitz, Shoeless The life and times o f  Joe Jackson,(Mcfarland and Company, 2001) p. 161
7 Elliot Asinof, Eight Men Out, (Holt, 1987)
8 Donald Gropman, Say it Ain’t So Joe, ( Lynx Books, 1988) p. 164
9 Harvey Frommer, Shoeless Joe and Ragtime Baseball, (Taylor Publishing, 1994) p.96
10 Donald Gropman, Say it Ain’t So Joe, ( Lynx Books, 1988) p.167
11 The record 12 hits though impressive is misleading since it was in eight games o f the nine game series. 
There were only three other nine game series 1903, 1920, and 1921.
12 Harvey Frommer, Shoeless Joe and Ragtime Baseball, (Taylor Publishing, 1994) p. 104
13 Gene Carney, Burying the Black Sox, (Potomac Books, 2006) p.47
14 Ibid p. 106
15 Elliot Asinof, Eight Men Out, (Holt, 1987) p.98-101
16 Donald Gropman, Say it Ain’t So Joe, ( Lynx Books, 1988) p. 150
17 Elliot Asinof, Eight Men Out, (Holt, 1987) p. 110 and 111 The incredibly small crowd was blamed on 
rumors that Herrmann, the Reds owner had fixed the series to go extra long to make more money. This 
combined with horrible traffic the day before left people home instead o f in the seats.
18 Ibid p. 113
19 Ibid p. 115 Kid Gleason
20 Harvey Frommer, Shoeless Joe and Ragtime Baseball, (Taylor Publishing, 1994) p. 114-115
21 William R. Herzog II, The Faith of 50 Million, (Westminster John Knox Press, 2002) p. 117
22 Donald Gropman, Say it Ain’t So Joe, ( Lynx Books, 1988) p.172
23 Ibid p.174
24 Ibid p.178
25 Ibid p.182 Comiskey’s note to the eight suspended players closed with this.
26 Donald Gropman, Say it Ain’t So Joe, ( Lynx Books, 1988) p. 184-188
27 Ibid p.190
28 Ibid p. 198
29 Ibid p.200
30 Ibid p.201
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II
Analyzing the Impact of Three Histories of World War II: 
Books by Bullock, Shirer, and Churchill 
By Kevin Prendergast ‘10
“The Second World War was an altogether different conflict, but the will to win was 
every bit as important -  indeed it was more so. The contest was popularly perceived to 
be about issues o f life and death for whole communities rather than for their fighting 
forces alone. They were issues, wrote one American observer in 1939, ‘worth dying 
for ’ ...Half a century later the level o f cruelty, destruction and sacrifice that it engendered 
is hard to comprehend, let alone recapture. Fifty years o f security and prosperity have 
opened up a gulf between our own age and the age o f the crisis and violence that
propelled the world into war. "
I. The Second World War: An Introduction
It was a war that brought some twenty-five countries into full-scale armed 
conflict. It was a war that cost some sixty million lives in all, both military and civilian. 
No other war in world history has ever claimed as many human lives, cost as much, in 
terms of the amount of monetary destruction of infrastructure, or incited as much hatred 
and utter brutality as this war. There were countless battles and skirmishes taking place 
simultaneously all across the globe. World War II was also marked by genocide on a 
massive scale in a number of places, such as in the city of Nanking in China, or 
throughout Europe in German death camps.
For all of these reasons alike, it is important that people know what happened at 
these places and others in the bloodiest war known, to mankind. There have been 
thousands of books published recounting the events of the Second World War. Some 
have been published by professional historians, documenting the major figures who 
helped shape the course of the war. One such example of this type is Hitler: A Study in 
Tyranny by the renowned British historian Alan Bullock. Some books that have been 
written about the war are memoirs, written by those who lived through various parts of 
the war. An example of this type is Berlin Diary: The Journal o f a Foreign 
Correspondent, 1934-1941 by William Shirer, who was an American CBS news 
correspondent who lived in Berlin, Germany during the rise of Adolf Hitler and his Nazi 
regime. One final type of book about the Second World War is a book written by a major 1
1 Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995), 324-325.
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figure from the World War II-era on the entire war. In this case, an example would be 
Winston Churchill’s massive, six-volume history of the Second World War, bearing the 
same name. However, for the purposes of this paper, the book in particular that will be 
analyzed is the first of the six volumes, The Gathering Storm. While Churchill was not 
an academic or a professional historian, he devoted many years to creating a complete 
history of the war. Although he attempts to write the history as a detached historian, it 
still cannot be denied that he is writing about events which he helped shape.
Nonetheless, the enormous six-volume history remains one of the most important works 
about the entire Second World War.
II. Hitler: A Study in Tyranny
When it was first published in 1952, Alan Bullock’s biography of Hitler was one 
of the first epic biographies published of the man who headed Nazi Germany. Much of 
the information that helped Bullock write the book came out of the many different 
testimonies of the 1945-1946 Nuremberg Trials, in which major German leaders were 
tried as war criminals. Many of the German leaders placed much of the blame on Adolf 
Hitler for the atrocities that occurred under the regime In the Preface to the Abridged 
Edition of his book, Bullock writes, the major question, “suggested by much that was 
said at the Nuremberg Trials, was to discover how great a part Hitler played in the history 
of the Third Reich and whether Goring and the other defendants were exaggerating when 
they claimed that under the Nazi regime the will of one man, and of one man alone, was 
decisive.”2 It baffled Bullock how one man, especially one of such modest roots as Adolf 
Hitler, could rise to power and become so influential, so controlling of so many aspects 
of German life. For this reason, Bullock identifies his goal as “to offer an account of one 
of the most puzzling and remarkable careers in modem history.”3
As it did for so many others, Hitler’s rise to power in Germany greatly intrigued 
Alan Bullock. To him, the most pressing question was: how could this happen? How 
could one man come to become so revered that he could influence so many people to do 
such disastrous, horrific and, in other cases, utterly absurd things? Bullock identifies that 
historians have come to understand Hitler in many different ways. Some view Hitler as a 
brilliant orator, capable of so greatly captivating his listeners that they would do anything 
for him. Others view Hitler as a mere pawn to German capitalist interest. Even more 
have come to contend that Hitler was merely a symbol of the restless ambitions of 
Germany to one day dominate Europe.4 However, Bullock counters that all of these 
analyses are merely overly-simplified views of Hitler or of the German nation.
Bullock understands that Hitler’s rise occurred in the midst of a sweeping 
revolutionary time in Germany. It seems that it was almost a certainty that some 
politician at that time would feed off of the injustices of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles in 
an attempt to attain more power. For this reason, Bullock asserts that “Obviously,
Nazism was a complex phenomenon to which many factors -  social, economic, 
historical, psychological -  contributed.. .It may be true that a mass movement, strongly 
nationalistic, anti-Semitic, and radical, would have sprung up in Germany without
2 Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, Abridged Edition (New York: Harper Perennial Publishers, 
1991), vii.
3 Bullock, Hitler, vii.
4 Bullock, Hitler, 485.
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Hitler.” Thus, Bullock concedes that the time was ripe for Hitler to take power in 
Germany, because of the restlessness of the masses. People were so outraged at the 
failures of German leadership during the First World War. The economic hardships of 
the Great Depression and the hyperinflation which preceded it made daily life in 
Germany extremely miserable. Yet, as Bullock clearly identifies, “Hitler neither 
understood nor was interested in economics, but he was alive to the social and political 
consequences of events which affected the life of every family in Germany.”5 Thus, 
although Hitler had no real understanding of the science of economics and, quite frankly, 
no real interest in it, he understood how to capitalize on the plight of those who suffered 
during the Great Depression. This ability to understand the wants of the people around 
him allowed Hitler to use that knowledge to gain immense support from the 
disenfranchised.
Throughout the book, Bullock makes it clear that Adolf Hitler’s rise to power was 
the product of opportunism. He was incredibly skilled at preying on the wants and needs 
of the lower class people in Germany. As Bullock writes, “Hitler was the greatest 
demagogue in history. Those who add ‘only a demagogue’ fail to appreciate the nature 
of political power in an age of mass politics. As he himself said: ‘To be a leader, means 
to be able to move masses.’”6 Hitler was an excellent orator who was able to rouse a 
crowd like few others could ever do. The Nazi party in Germany was one that began in 
bars and warehouses, but was able to gain incredible support through the work of Hitler 
and others, such as Joseph Goebbels, who led the propaganda machine of the Nazi party. 
It was Hitler’s ability to spark the passions of thousands of crowds throughout his 
political career that turned the Nazi party into the controlling force that it was throughout 
World War II. Yet, as Bullock states, “The Nazi campaign could not have succeeded as 
it did by the ingenuity of its methods alone, if it had not at the same time corresponded 
and appealed to the mood of a considerable proportion of the German people.”7
Hitler was a master of building power by preying on the wants and needs of the 
working class. His masterful oratory skills made him into a major force in German 
politics even when many of the members of the German government did not like him. 
However, once the Nazi party headed the German government, it was their tactics of 
power politics that allowed them to suppress all opposition as well as they did. Hitler 
conveyed these right-wing totalitarian ideas ever since he was a young man living in 
Vienna. For instance, as Bullock writes, “Hitler reached the conclusion that: ‘the psyche 
of the broad masses is accessible only to what is strong and uncompromising... The 
masses of the people prefer the ruler to the suppliant and are filled with a stronger sense 
of mental security by a teaching that brooks no rival than by a teaching which offers them 
a liberal choice.”8 In this way, it seems quite evident that Hitler always had an 
inclination to the sort of totalitarian policies which he employed while he was in power. 
He saw no benefit in providing the masses with free speech or varying ideas on an issue. 
Rather, he thought that society actually benefitted from being told what to think by a 
strong leader. Further, as Bullock writes, “Hitler had no use for any democratic
5 Bullock, Hitler, 77.
6 Bullock, Hitler, 37.
7 Bullock, Hitler, 115.
8 Bullock, Hitler, 18.
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institution: free speech, free press, or parliament.”9 For, in Hitler’s own words, “The 
majority represents not only ignorance but cowardice...The majority can never replace 
the man.”10
This is the essence of what Bullock contends made Hitler into the incredibly 
powerful figure which he became. While he was an up-and-coming younger politician in 
Germany, he preyed on the restless sentiments of the masses, who were feeling wronged 
by the Treaty of Versailles and by the German government’s ineffective economic 
policies. He used his excellent oratory skills and persuasiveness, combined with 
Goebbels’ extremely effective propaganda, to build a major movement in the German 
political landscape. He used the system to attain power, then changed the system to fit 
his wants once he had power. As Bullock writes, in doing the things he did, “Hitler never 
abandoned the cloak of legality; instead he turned the law inside out and made illegality 
legal.”11 Thus, while it is possible that another leader could have achieved power in a 
similar way in Germany, it is doubtful that few could have achieved the devastating 
results that Adolf Hitler did.
III. Berlin Diary: The Journal o f a Foreign Correspondent, 1934-1941
William L. Shirer’s Berlin Diary provides a very important American perspective 
to Hitler’s rise to power from someone who lived in Berlin during the time period. It is 
interesting, however, that this book is not the one that made Shirer most famous. Despite 
its importance because of the fact that Shirer was writing a firsthand account of Hitler’s 
rise to power, Shirer’s book entitled The Rise and Fall o f the Third Reich is actually the 
book for which most people know Shirer. Berlin Diary is also particularly relevant 
because, while many of Shirer’s writings come from his time in Berlin, there are certain 
periods in which Shirer travels to other major cities throughout Europe, such as London, 
Vienna, Warsaw, and others. Thus, he is able to provide another interesting perspective 
on Hitler’s rise in Germany.
It is also worth noting that the book, Berlin Diary, was published around the time 
that the United States entered the war in 1941. Thus, its importance as a way for many 
living at the time to understand what happened to get the world tossed into such a war is 
something that should be remembered as well. The reason why Shirer decided to leave is 
because the German government placed increasing pressure on Shirer to report the 
official Nazi state-issued news reports and not his own personal ideas and opinions on 
what was happening in Germany. For this reason, Shirer became more and more 
concerned about not only his ability to report the accurate news, but for his own personal 
safety as well. For this reason, the diary comes to an end on December 13, 1940, with 
Shirer writing aboard a ship bound for the United States. He reflects on his time in 
Europe by writing, “I had spent all fifteen of my adult years [in Europe],. .they had been 
happy years, personally, and for all people in Europe they had had meaning and borne 
hope until the war came and the Nazi blight and the hatred and the fraud and the political 
gangsterism and the murder and the massacre and the incredible intolerance and all the
9 Bullock, Hitler, 16.
10 Bullock, Hitler, 16.
11 Bullock, Hitler, 141
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suffering...”12. This passage is a good representative of many of the incredibly cruel 
things that Shirer witnessed over the course of his seven years in Berlin during the Nazi 
rise.
Shirer was also able to shed light on many other aspects of Nazi life during his 
seven years stationed in Berlin. For instance, he writes at length on how he perceived 
Adolf Hitler and his rise in Germany. On September 5, 1934, very early in the diary, he 
writes, “every word dropped by Hitler seemed like an inspired Word from on high.
Man’s -  or at least the German’s -  critical faculty is swept away at such moments, and 
every lie pronounced is accepted as high truth itself.”13 This account seems to convey the 
same ideas as presented by Alan Bullock regarding Hitler’s incredible power of oratory 
and his ability to arouse a crowd in unity with the utmost ease. Also similar to the ideas 
presented by Bullock is the idea that these seemingly fanatical ideas were not Hitler’s 
alone. Rather, as Shirer writes, “It must also be noted down that Hitler’s frenzy for 
bloody conquest is by no means exclusive to him in Germany.”14 Shirer was absolutely 
appalled at some of the outlandish comments made by people in Germany at this time.
He could not believe some of the things people were believing. For instance, “As to the 
proclamation, it contained such statements as these, all wildly applauded as if they were 
new truths: ‘The German form of life is definitely determined for the next thousand 
years...There will be no revolution in Germany for the next one thousand years!”15.
Shirer also reported on the interactions between Hitler and other world leaders 
and was even able to see Hitler making speeches in front of the Reichstag early on in his 
time in Germany. One report, made in the days before the Munich Pact was agreed upon 
in 1938, states that “Hitler has demanded that Czechoslovakia not later than Saturday, 
October 1, agree to the handing over of Sudetenland to Germany...[yet] the German 
people I talked with in the streets of Cologne this morning, and in Berlin this evening, 
believe there’ll be peace.”16 Two days later, Shirer witnessed a speech made by Hitler in 
front of some fifteen thousand Nazi party members regarding the impending crisis.
Shirer recorded, “Curious audience, the fifteen thousand party Bonzen packed the hall. 
They applauded his words with usual enthusiasm...Twice Hitler screamed that this is 
absolutely his last territorial demand in Europe.”17 18It is simply incredible to read some of 
these vivid firsthand accounts of some of the most important events of the Second World 
War. It is for this reason, among others, that Shirer’s work still remains an important 
piece of the history of the war.
Not only did Shirer attend many major Nazi party gatherings as a reporter, but he 
was able to attain other information from Germans during this time as well. Naturally, 
because Shirer’s book was published during the war, many of his informants are not 
mentioned by name. On September 21, 1940, a man to whom Shirer refers as X, told
Shirer a “weird story” . After disconnecting the telephone and ensuring that no one was 
listening through the crack of the door, X proceeded to tell Shirer that “the Gestapo is
12 William L. Shirer, Berlin Diary: The Journal of a Foreign Correspondent, 1934-1941, (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf Publishers, 1941), 605.
13 Shirer, Berlin Diary, 19.
14 Shirer, Berlin Diary, 585.
15 Shirer, Berlin Diary, 19.
16 Shirer, Berlin Diary, 140.
17 Shirer, Berlin Diary, 141.
18 Shirer, Berlin Diary, 512.
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now systematically bumping off the mentally deficient people of the Reich. The Nazis 
call them ‘mercy deaths.’”19 A few months later, on November 25, 1940, Shirer adds 
more details to the gruesome story, writing, “I have at last got to the bottom of these 
‘mercy killings.’ It’s an evil tale. The Gestapo, with the knowledge and approval of the 
German government, is systematically putting to death the mentally deficient population 
of the Reich... A conservative and trustworthy German tells me he estimates the number 
at a hundred thousand. I think that figure is too high." Thus, it is evident that, although 
Shirer lived in Berlin for nearly seven years and witnessed so many eye-opening things in 
Nazi Germany, he still could not fathom the atrocities that had occurred and would 
continue to occur under Adolf Hitler.
IV. The Gathering Storm
Winston Churchill’s The Second World War still remains one of the most 
definitive histories on the war. It was written in six volumes, published over six years, 
and contains thousands of pages of information about the war. The masterpiece even 
helped earn Winston Churchill the 1953 Nobel Prize in Literature. In the Presentation 
Speech made when Churchill accepted his award, the presenting member of the Swedish 
Academy stated, “Very seldom have great statesmen and warriors also been great 
writers... Churchill’s political and literary achievements are of such magnitude that one is 
tempted to resort to portray him as a Caesar who also has the gift of Cicero’s pen... With 
all due respects to archives and documents, there is something special about history 
written by a man who has himself helped to make it.”21
Much of Churchill’s first volume, The Gathering Storm, which regards the period 
from 1919 through May 10, 1940, is dedicated to portraying how the Second World War 
was very much a war that could have easily been stopped. For instance, he explicitly 
writes in the preface to The Gathering Storm, “One day President Roosevelt told me that 
he was asking publicly for suggestions about what the war should be called. I said at 
once ‘The Unnecessary War.’ There never was a war more easy to stop than that which 
has just wrecked what was left of the world from the previous struggle.”22 Churchill 
contends that if European leaders had not been so quick to appease Hitler on numerous 
occasions that the problem could have been resolved in a much easier way than it was. If 
Europe had cared to notice Hitler’s rise to power, it would have been a much easier 
problem to solve. However, as he writes, “The ceaseless struggles and gradual 
emergence of Adolf Hitler as a national figure were little noticed by the victors.”23 
Churchill is also quite critical of the victors of the First World War for their harsh 
treatment of Germany at the Versailles Conference, calling the treaty and subsequent 
actions taken toward Germany “The Follies of the Victors.”24
There were numerous other occasions on which Hitler could have easily been 
stopped. Regarding the German breach of the Versailles Treaty through armed build-up, 
Churchill wrote, “The United States had washed their hands of all concern with Europe,
19 Shirer, Berlin Diary, 512.
20 Shirer, Berlin Diary, 569.
21 S. Siwertz, “Presentation Speech for The Nobel Prize in Literature 1953,” The Nobel Foundation, 
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/1953/press.html.
22 Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm, (New York: The Houghton Mifflin Company, 1986), vii-viii.
23 Churchill, The Gathering Storm, 27.
24 Churchill, The Gathering Storm, 3-13.
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apart from wishing well to everybody, and were sure they would never have to be 
bothered with it again. But France, Great Britain, and also -  decidedly -  Italy.. .felt 
bound to challenge this definite act of treaty-violation by Hitler.” Thus, he sees it as a 
mistake by the United States to turn to isolationist policies after the First World War. 
Also, as he notes, much of Europe was too bogged down in its own affairs to worry about 
German problems. However, he conveys the cause of his own country as well as Italy 
and France as a noble one, in which few cared to join.
One other instance of which Churchill writes at length is the debate over the 
Sudetenland and the subsequent Munich Conference, which he deems “The Tragedy of 
Munich.”25 6 Churchill finds this to be very much a turning point in the growing conflict 
with Germany. After the appeasement of Hitler, Churchill recognizes that a number of 
major European nations began to deem it necessary to build up their military, as the 
concern over another war began to mount. As Churchill writes, “After the sense of relief 
springing from the Munich agreement had worn off Mr. Chamberlain and his government 
found themselves confronted by a sharp dilemma. The Prime Minister had said, ‘I 
believe it is peace for our time.’ But the majority of his colleagues wished to utilise ‘our 
time’ to rearm as rapidly as possible.”27 Thus, it is evident that, although many hoped 
the Munich Pact would bring peace, many European leaders were not entirely blind to the 
growing political and military aspirations of Adolf Hitler and the rest of Nazi Germany. 
However, this major mistake had been made and, just as many armies began to grow 
throughout Europe, Hitler’s did as well. And, the rest of the story, which comes to fill 
thousands more pages in Churchill’s six volume work, as they say, is history.
V. Conclusion
All of these three books differ in their style. All of these three books are written 
by different people with different perspectives -  one a professional historian, one a news 
correspondent, and another a major player in the events of the war. Yet, all three of these 
works are immensely valuable and remain to be so. They all serve to make future 
generations aware of the seemingly unfathomable events that took place from 1933-1945. 
As Churchill writes in the preface to The Gathering Storm, “It is my earnest hope that 
pondering upon the past may give guidance in days to come, enable a new generation to 
repair some of the errors of former years, and thus govern, in accordance with the needs 
and glory of man, the awful unfolding scene of the future.”28 This is how these three 
books, very different in both their perspective and content, all serve a very similar 
purpose -  to educate those who were not able, thankfully, to witness some of the 
unspeakable atrocities of this horrific war. Thus, hopefully, by learning about the past 
through works such as these three, one would hope that future generations can use the 
lessons learned out of this war to create a much better future for both themselves and 
their children.
25 Churchill, The Gathering Storm, 63.
26 Churchill, The Gathering Storm, 131-139.
27 Churchill, The Gathering Storm, 140.
28 Churchill, The Gathering Storm, viii.
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III
Dean Acheson
and American Foreign Policy, 1947 -1950 
By Victoria Valusek ‘10
Dean Gooderham Acheson was the fifty-first United States Secretary of State 
appointed to this Cabinet position by President Harry S. Truman. The confirmation of his 
position occurred in January 1949 and he served through January of 1953. Acheson was 
instrumental in developing and implementing United States’ foreign policy which had 
positive, profound, and long-lasting effect. The point to be examined here is the 
evolution of his policy from benign coexistence to aggressive containment. This thesis 
will be examined during that period of his career from 1947 (as Under Secretary) through 
1950, specifically, his role in the development and application of the Truman Doctrine, 
the Marshall Plan, its military corollary the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
and NSC-68. The Mutual Defense Assistance Program will also be included because 
although not Achesonian in origin, he did see it to its conclusion.
However, as is the case with any story, some background information is 
necessary, if not as a determinant of/for favorable opinion, then at least to present a more 
complete picture of the events about to unfold. It is essential to know the character 
development, in order to understand the direction(s) Dean Acheson took as a Statesman. 
As Acheson himself so succinctly phrased it, “many of the moralistic maxims adapted to 
the conduct of foreign affairs are apt to reflect personal prejudice or sententious 
sentiment.”1
In 1893, the eldest child of Eleanor Gertrude Gooderham and Edward Campion 
Acheson was bom: Dean Gooderham Acheson.2 His upper middle class family lived in 
Middletown, Connecticut, where his father a Bishop in the Episcopal Church. The 
family’s influence and income was considerably supplemented by Mrs. Acheson’s 
prosperous father, and so the Achesons lived quite well. They could afford to have Dean 
privately educated -  Groton, Yale, Harvard Law. Never an exceptionally good student, 
Dean Acheson did manage to overcome the fecklessness of youth, and at law school did 
quite well. At Harvard he was a student of, and eventually became good friends with, 
Felix Frankfurter.4 Through Frankfurter’s connection with/to Justice Brandeis, Acheson 
was able to secure a clerkship (with Brandeis) at the United States Supreme Court.5 He 
would clerk for Brandeis for two years, and become an ardent admirer of Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes.6 He joined the Washington law Firm of Rublee/Covington and did the
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business of lawyering. His was a successful career, but not an altogether remarkable 
period in Acheson’s life.7
In 1933, President Franklin D. Roosevelt approved his nomination for and 
subsequent appointment to and confirmation as United States Under Secretary of the 
Treasury (with William Woodin serving as Secretary).8 There were two things which 
militated against the probable success of this appointment: Dean Acheson knew nothing 
about the function of a bureaucrat and he knew even less about the world of 
finance/economics.9 There was a third ingredient in this cocktail for disaster. Shortly 
after Acheson was confirmed as Under Secretary, Woodin became gravely ill, and 
Acheson took his place as Acting Secretary of the Treasury.10 At this time, the Great 
Depression was well underway, and in an attempt to bring the economy of the United 
States under control, and restore some stability to the commercial markets, Roosevelt 
believed that an artificial manipulation of the price of gold may be the best course of 
action to revive the economy. He thus ordered his Acting Secretary to actively engage in 
the execution of this plan.11 At first, Acheson demurred, believing the action, if not 
illegal, then at least beyond his purview. He would act at the President’s direction only 
reluctantly, and then only after denying any responsibility for such policy.12 Such 
behavior was not acceptable from a member of the President’s cabinet, and Acheson was 
asked to resign.13 The enmity which Acheson bore toward Franklin D. Roosevelt would 
last to the end of his life.14 Acheson would accept little blame for this humiliation which 
he had brought upon himself. However, there were valuable lessons here, and Acheson 
learned them well.15
Dean Acheson was a bureaucrat and bureaucrats are functionaries. He would 
become the quintessential bureaucratic in-fighter and jealously guard his department from 
those who would wish to intrude. Effective high level bureaucrats must be the best 
functioning executives. They must not only manage the business at hand and the 
department, but they must also know the difference between what they desire personally 
by way of action and what the needs are of those for whom they work. If one is to be 
held responsible for policy, one would want to be part of the decision making process, 
and if one is to be part of the decision making process, that person must be proactive, and 
proactive means contribution and compromise. For Acheson, contribution meant 
preparedness (knowledge) and compromise extended primarily to particulars, not 
principle -  to his professional life, but not to his private life.
Fortunately for Acheson, the professional and personal indignities he suffered as a 
result of his uncanny ability to be “hoist[ed] on one’s own petard,” were not fatal. The 
days spent in the wilderness would stretch for eight years, ending in 1941. His nemesis, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, approved his appointment as Assistant Secretary of State (with 
Cordell Hull being Secretary).16 Although this reappointment was politically motivated, 
Dean Acheson was not a “politician.” His close association with the Democratic Party, 
and, again, his friendship with Frankfurter were instrumental in this resurrection, but it 
appears that it was Roosevelt himself who took the initiative to bring Acheson back into 
public service.17 His impression of the State Department under Hull was one “...without 
direction... adrift, carried hither and yon by the currents of war or pushed about by 
collisions with more purposeful craft.”18 He was not disappointed, but neither was he 
impressed.
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Assigned to Economic Affairs, Acheson was relegated to approving material 
shipments to and from the United States and various other countries -  not in the realm of 
policy making.19 Edward Stettinius, Hull’s successor as Secretary, reshuffled the 
department and reassigned Acheson to Congressional Liaison (while he still served as an 
Assistant Secretary). In Economic Affairs and as Congressional Liaison, Acheson was 
able to see firsthand how the legislative processes of the United States worked, i.e., “its 
actual role in our scheme of government as against the constitutional theory of it.”20 In 
addition, he was able to see which representatives were responsible for making the 
legislative process work. Stettinius’s tour of duty as Secretary was quite brief. “Snow 
White,” as Stettinius was affectionately referred to by Acheson, was succeeded by James 
Byrnes in July 1945.22 For Acheson, who had never been very impressed by Stettinius’s 
performance within the State Department, the Secretary’s departure was of no significant 
loss.
Acheson tendered his resignation, it was accepted, and in August of 1945 he was 
again about to engage in the profession of lawyering. Within a week, as fate would have 
it and as he himself would later remark, “I was to learn how vast a part luck plays in our 
lives,” Acheson was United States Under Secretary of State (pending confirmation) -  his
resignation having been accepted and then rescinded within days of submission.
Acheson did have misgivings about this decision to return to the State Department. He 
was “acutely conscious that [he] was entering Indian country.”24 As the case would be, 
Acheson held this job as Under Secretary of State for six-hundred seventy-two days.25 
Secretary Byrnes would spend most of his time out of the country (of his 562 days as 
Secretary, Byrnes was away for 350 of them) and thus, the business of running the 
Department of State fell to Acheson.26 As a result of Byrnes’s absence, Acheson became
27Acting Secretary and was thus required to attend the President’s cabinet meetings.
Dean Acheson had now moved to the center of policy debate, his counsel being sought 
and his input seriously considered. However, Acheson’s effectiveness was seriously 
undermined by Byrnes who would occasionally by-pass or contradict his Under Secretary 
in personnel and policy matters. As Acheson recalled, “the lines of command [during his 
time under Byrnes] were not clear.”28
The work to which he would expend all of his effort was daunting, “the enormity 
of the task...after the wars in Europe and Asia ended in 1945, only slowly revealed 
itself.. .to create a world out o f chaos."29 However, Acheson did not hesitate to engage 
the challenge before him. Two critical points soon became evident if he was to make a 
positive and lasting contribution. The first involved the role of the State Department. 
Roosevelt was his own Secretary of State and hence the function and status of the 
Department fell into a state of desuetude, its counsel not sought nor heeded. Acheson 
worked to restore the Department to its historically preeminent position within the 
cabinet, by being knowledgeable about all matters that would rightfully fall under the 
purview of State, and then ensuring against incursions by other departments on its 
territory. It also helped that President Truman was predisposed to considering the 
Department of State in a favorable light.
The second critical point was to serve as faithfully and accurately the needs of his 
President. Concerning this latter condition, Secretary Byrnes appeared to be woefully 
inadequate, especially when it came to keeping the President advised of negotiations and 
discussions with foreign governments. For Byrnes, this shortcoming would have fatal
The Histories, Volume 9, Number 2 25
consequences (as Secretary of State). Yet for Acheson this would again be no great 
loss. He thought little more of Byrnes’s performance as Secretary of State than that of 
either of his two predecessors.
In February 1946, Joseph Stalin outlined in “brutal clarity” that Soviet foreign 
policy would not include peaceful coexistence. Shortly thereafter, George Kennan 
(United States Charge d’affaires, Moscow) followed this with his “Long Telegram,” 
warning that the United States should be prepared for an extended political struggle with 
the Soviets, who could only be satisfied with the dominance and destruction of all things
not communist. Americans’ sympathies toward their Russian war allies began to 
change, and Truman, the politician, was quick to take note of this. However, he did not 
demand that his executive advisors blindly follow (most of them owed their allegiance 
and positions to Roosevelt and displayed only minimal loyalty to Truman). Acheson was 
a case in point. According to several historians, such as Robert Beisner33 and James 
Chace,34 Acheson at this point in time was not overly concerned and still felt that some 
common ground could be found on which to base diplomatic relations with Russia. For 
example, Acheson’s continued work on international atomic energy control is cited as 
evidence of his belief that cooperative ties with the Soviets could be still be established.
In all fairness, it should be noted that Acheson did not volunteer for this particular 
assignment.
The midterm elections of 1946 clearly demonstrated dissatisfaction with the 
policies of the Democratic Party and foreign policy was not an exception. The Secretary 
of Agriculture, Henry Wallace, who had advocated a more conciliatory approach toward 
the Soviet Union, had set off an internecine cabinet fight with Secretary Byrnes, a fight 
which had caused a rift within the Democratic Party. In the case of Truman, it did not 
take too much convincing that Russia was not to be trusted. Early on, Truman had seen 
the weakness of his predecessor’s treatments with Russia and quickly abandoned that 
tack. Acheson’s conversion took a little longer, but it was no less sincere. The part the 
United States was to play internationally was becoming, if anything, much clearer. It was 
also becoming equally evident that resolution of the Soviet problem would involve 
addressing issues not only in Europe, but also in Asia. The United States had to assume 
leadership in this struggle against communism and could not revert to its historical 
sanctuary of isolationism.
President Truman gave General George C. Marshall the assignment to assess the 
situation in China and advise as to the best course of action to be pursued vis-a-vis the 
communist/nationalist struggle. Acheson was appointed Marshall’s Washington liaison 
through whom all information would be relayed to the President and vice versa.36 This 
was a particularly awkward position for Acheson because he now had to serve two 
masters, President Truman and Secretary Byrnes.37
At this time, the question of policy in regards to the use of atomic 
weapons/nuclear power needed to be addressed and so, Acheson (Lilienthal) was 
appointed to the advisory commission. In January of 1946, Secretary Byrnes appointed 
Dean Acheson to chair a committee which was to develop policy proposals for the 
control of atomic energy. Acheson gathered a distinguished board of members and by 
the following March, a working draft was being circulated: the Acheson-Lilienthal 
Plan. The proposal recommended, after a period of transition, that control would pass 
from the United States to an international body. At the time of the draft’s release,
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Secretary Byrnes recommended to President Truman the appointment of Bernard Baruch 
as United States delegate to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission.40 Baruch 
assembled his own committee to consider atomic energy control and by the end of April, 
had a proposal. The ensuing dust-up with Acheson was predictable, when Baruch was 
able to get the President to endorse his proposal over the Acheson-Lilienthal Plan. The 
denouement in this little drama was that neither plan was ever adopted,41 and Bernard 
Baruch had one less friend in the world.42
In addition to the issue of using atomic weapons/nuclear power, appropriate 
response to matters, such as those regarding Palestine, South America, Soviet intentions 
in Western Germany/Japan and its interests in the eastern Mediterranean, and especially 
the problems confronting the Western European nations became the responsibility of the 
office of the Under Secretary at this time.43 Unhappy with Byrnes’s style, President 
Truman chose George C. Marshall to be the next United States Secretary of State 
(January 1947).44 Acheson’s reacted to this change of command thusly: “This whole 
episode is a thoroughly unhappy memory.”45 Once again, Acheson tendered his 
resignation, it becoming effective in July 1947. However, much was to happen before 
this departure.
This “change of command” might not have been to Acheson’s liking, but 
President Truman’s choice of General George Catlett Marshall to succeed James Byrnes 
as Secretary of State could not have been better. There are very few people to whom 
Dean Acheson gave ungrudging respect, and besides the two mentioned in this paragraph 
(Truman and Marshall) could only be added Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes -  an 
observation only as it concerns Acheson’s professional, not personal life. Rarely did 
Acheson pay a compliment to anyone without a back-handed reservation. In this regard, 
Acheson particularly liked Douglas Southhall Freeman’s assessment of his (i.e., 
Acheson’s) own attitude: “Acheson found it difficult to conceal his contempt for the 
contemptible.”46
On March 12, 1947, President Harry S. Truman delivered an address to a joint 
session of Congress requesting aid for both Greece and Turkey -  this speech for ever 
after was known as the Truman Doctrine.47 Joseph M. Jones (State Department, Public 
Affairs) was the primary writer, but the real force behind this speech was Dean Acheson 
who had insisted that this speech be “precisely formulated” in order to give its full, 
intended effect. The necessity for this action was not unanticipated. Both Secretary 
Byrnes and his successor, Marshall, had been aware of the deteriorating conditions 
engulfing the two nations in particular and Europe in general. In addition, both men had 
instructed Acheson to prepare for this eventuality.49 As Acheson would later reflect, 
during this particular period of activity,
The financial effort was immense. So were the production and military 
efforts. But...the real achievement.. .lies, I think, in the boldness, the 
imaginativeness, the creativeness of the thinking, and perhaps most of all 
in the will which those in charge maintained and communicated to the 
country. This stemmed straight from President Truman himself. The 
sustained leadership and effort...represented a revolution in American 
foreign policy and the assumption of burdens and responsibilities wholly 
new to us.50
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By late 1946, time and events had overwhelmed the governments of Greece and 
Turkey. They could no longer deal effectively with the problems with which they were 
faced.51 Political and economic turmoil had wracked both countries since the cessation of 
armed conflict in 1945. The economy of Greece needed constant infusions from outside 
sources, and the communists had engaged in an armed rebellion to take power. The 
British had managed to keep the Greek government from going into bankruptcy, and it 
was only the British presence which had temporarily checked the communist insurgency. 
Turkey had similar economic difficulties, but its real threat had come from without.
Stalin had been pressuring Turkey to establish joint control of the Dardanelles. In 
1946, there was every indication that it might come at the cost of a military invasion of 
Turkish territory by Russia.54
The situation was becoming more precarious with each passing day in the new 
year. On Friday, February 21, 1947, Acheson took delivery of a “blue piece of paper” 
from Britain’s United States representative, Lord Inverchapel.55 In diplomatic parlance, 
this was a formal communication between governments -  the advising of one country by 
another of actions intended or already taken which might affect the policy, and/or 
interests of the receiving government. In this particular instance, Great Britain indicated 
that it would no longer be able to maintain its support of Greece and Turkey either 
economically or militarily, and it was soon to withdraw from the area. The cost of this 
unmandated protection was beyond either the ability or the will of England to bear. 
England’s own economy was in need of attention, and public support for continued action 
in Greece had been exhausted.56 For Acheson, this development, though not specifically 
foreseen, necessarily had to be factored into any American program of relief. As 
Acheson saw the situation, America alone had the material, political, and economic 
means to provide relief.57
Having already been instructed to prepare plans for direct aid, it was a matter for 
Acheson only to gather, collate, and assemble the material in some cogent and 
understandable format. This he did throughout that weekend (February 22nd -  23rd). He
58advised his bosses, Truman and Marshall, of developments and asked their input.
Neither could offer anything by way of addition or improvement to Acheson’s work.
From the standpoint of State Department involvement, it was through Acheson’s efforts 
that the plan was ready for presentation that Monday (February 24th) following receipt of 
England’s advisory note.59 Truman’s reaction was immediate: the proposal would go 
forward because the security of the nation demanded it, and “the consequences of 
inaction were clear enough.”60 Acheson, having made his case to Truman and Marshall, 
presented the facts to legislative leaders, at the White House. Approaching the meeting 
“with our congressional masters,” Acheson described the urgency of the matter thusly, “I 
knew we were met at Armageddon.. .never have I spoken under such a pressing sense 
that the issue was up to me alone.”61 The Congressional leaders proved, for the most 
part, to be receptive to the presentation made to them by and at the request of the Under
Secretary (through the President, of course). The press was also given the same
62presentation by Acheson, by the end of that same week.
Senator Arthur Vandenberg (R-MI) was an early supporter of the proposal and he 
would shepherd the subsequent bill authorizing relief through his Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee -  and voting for adoption upon release for full Senate approval.63
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As Acheson described it, Vandenberg’s “part in the enactment of this proposal into law 
was invaluable.”64 Opposition was minimal and had little impact on the final bill -  a 
niggling criticism raised by Walter Lippmann resulted in lip service being paid to the 
United Nations, an organization for which Acheson had little regard (although he was 
never injudicious to the point of publicly denouncing it while in State service).65 
Acheson appeared numerous times before Senate and House committees treating of the 
proposal.66 Acheson offered testimony in support of the bill, at one point addressing one- 
eleven questions brought up by inquiring legislators.67 The Greek-Turkey Aid Act was 
approved by both houses of Congress and signed into law by President Truman on May 
22, 1947.68
Greece and Turkey would receive approximately $400,000,000.00 ($250,000,000 
to Greece and $150,000,000 to Turkey) in aid under this bill. Over the ensuing years, 
Greece would receive over one billion dollars in U.S. assistance (it appears that Britain 
had accurately assessed the financial situation).69 For the United States, and Dean 
Acheson in particular, this event had repercussions that went far beyond economic and 
military relief. For Acheson, it was as an epiphany, an awakening to a reality of which he 
was aware, but not cognizant. That reality involved a Communist Russia which he now 
perceived as evil. Content heretofore with a kind of live and let live attitude, Acheson 
now moved to a more hardened resolve in his dealings with the Russia which he now 
considered “an eager and ruthless opponent.” He had been mistakenly accused of 
“appeasement” in his prior considerations of U.S.-Soviet Union relations. In reality, 
Acheson’s early position was a kind of benign accommodation (not “appeasement” and 
certainly not sympathy). Heretofore a Washington warrior, Acheson would take on an 
additional role as a Cold warrior.
Russia would not be discouraged or dissuaded by words or by example: “the 
Soviets negotiate by acts and not debate, offer and counteroffer. Their purpose may be to 
separate allies or undermine governments.. .win over uncommitted peoples. Or.. .to bring 
a sense of relaxation, good-will, security, before.. .some energetic offensive.” As such, 
Acheson recognized that only action would be of use against Soviet designs. Russia’s 
constant probing for weakness of resolve and unity among the United States and its allies 
had to be aggressively countered if the specter of totalitarianism was to be overcome. 
Acheson sought policies which would lead to positions of strength, and if at the same 
time such policies could undermine the Soviet programs, then so much the better. He 
cast aside anything that threatened to harm his security interests. Furthermore, Acheson 
believed that if any action was of benefit to his opponent, it had to be doubly avoided.72 
Yet the actions of Russia were not the only source that motivated Acheson to change. 
Domestic pressures were also probably equally responsible for this redirection in 
Acheson’s thinking.
In this atmosphere, the politics of containment began to take shape. The crises in 
Greece and Turkey evidenced an urgent need to stem the tide and influence of the ever 
expansionist-minded Stalin. The old European order was not able to counter, by any 
means, the push of Russia by itself, but it was necessary to preserve the illusion that some 
resistance would be made, and Acheson committed himself to the task of building this 
allied resistance until it became a real force: “no balance of power in Europe or 
elsewhere, adequate to restrain Soviet power is possible unless the weight of the United 
States is put into the scales, without association with the United States, the European
The Histories, Volume 9, Number 2 29
powers cannot prevent the leaders of the Soviet Union from having their way in Western 
Europe” -  an observation made by Acheson at a much later date, but consistently 
applicable.73 He knew that although the United States was the strongest of all the liberal 
democracies, its resources were not limitless. It could not be everything, to everyone, 
everywhere, all of the time. He would build upon those countries which appeared to have 
the best prospects for success. This plan for rebuilding would of necessity require the 
resuscitation of the political and economic machines of both Germany and Japan and 
eventually, their respective military capabilities if the Soviets were to be check-mated.74 
By intervening in Greece and Turkey, the United States (read also, Acheson) 
demonstrated its (his) willingness to be the leader of the free world and America’s allies 
paid close attention.
In ideology, technology and historical tradition, the United States was closest to 
Western Europe and so it was little wonder that Acheson focused his rebuilding efforts on 
America’s former allies. Western European political ideology tended to the same 
liberal democracy found in America. Technologically, Western European and American 
industry were on familiar terms. The historical traditions of both reflect basically the 
same cultural values. Economically and financially, Western Europe and the United 
States were oriented toward free market capitalism (arguments in regards to colonialism 
and imperialism aside).76 Acheson thus, turned to the task of restoring and revivifying 
the agriculture, industry, and trade of Europe. A strong Europe would be America’s first 
defense against a communist Russia:
There developed on our Atlantic coast a community, which has spread 
across the continent, connected with Western Europe by common 
institutions and moral and ethical beliefs. Similarities of this kind are not 
superficial, but fundamental. They are the strongest kind of ties, because 
they are based on moral conviction, on acceptance of the same values in 
life...77
The Marshall Plan was the direct result of the Truman Doctrine, but the ideas, 
ideals, and problems that the plan sought to address (like the Doctrine itself) had been 
accumulating for some time previous. Long before the Second World War had 
concluded, the need for effective post-war management of world affairs had been 
anticipated. Though not an economist, Acheson could readily appreciate the complex 
financial arrangements which would have to be made if there was to be an orderly 
transition from the war-time economy, having served as head of a committee whose 
purpose was to develop plans for this very possibility in 1941 (albeit he could not recall a 
single meeting).79 The problem with which Acheson was faced was what fiscal policy 
would best ensure the reinvigoration and restoration of a business climate conducive to 
stability and at the same time, be compatible with foreign policy and vice versa. 
Responsible fiscal policy and effective foreign policy would have to be mutually 
inclusive.
Post-war global economic dislocation was the reality. The most important 
priority was to ensure that adequate food supplies be distributed as and where needed.
The newly minted United Nations would be the first point of coordination for such relief, 
and for the most part, the financial end of it was underwritten by the United States.80 The
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United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) was established for 
the purpose of relief/food distribution, under the direction of Fiorella La Guardia. In 
the beginning, both President Truman and Acheson both supported UNRRA’s efforts, 
with Acheson at one point urging government seizure of needed materials in order to 
maintain effective levels of assistance: “Emphasizing that he was expressing his personal 
views, Mr. Acheson told a news conference that the government should go out and take 
the wheat and flour it needed to make foreign commitments.”
The United Nations’ effort soon ran afoul of United States domestic politics,
when it was discovered that certain nations accepting relief/food were doing so at the
expense of maintaining and expanding their national armies. Yugoslavia was the case in
point with Tito, its communist leader, having done just this. The displeasure of the
American electorate was expressed at the polls in the November 1946 mid-term elections
in which “the Democrats lost control of congress for the first time in sixteen years.”84 As
a result, support for UNRRA was withdrawn and the United States would establish its
own relief/food effort, on its own terms, and in what it perceived to be its interests (and 
85those of its allies).
Throughout early 1947, plans were being prepared to provide U.S.-sponsored 
relief to replace that which was to be discarded, but on an even broader scale. However, 
it was not until late spring that anything concrete began developing. Acheson had been 
working with various other departments on the issue, and within the State Department, 
Marshall had directed the new Policy Planning Staff to take up the matter (also to be 
overseen by Acheson).86 By May the “Marshall Plan” began to take shape. In this plan, 
the United States would finance European reconstruction by utilizing a combination of 
grants and loans to stimulate growth and consumption. Relief was not the purpose of the 
plan. As the plan evolved, it was modified and interpreted to overcome opposition from 
the American people and their elected representatives.
Acheson was the first to publicly broach the government’s economic assistance 
initiative -  first to the League of Women Voters (Washington, DC), and then to the 
Delta Council (Cleveland, Mississippi) : “It is one of the principle aims of our foreign 
policy.. .to use our economic and financial resources... [as].. .necessary if we are to 
preserve our own freedom and our own democratic institutions. It is necessary for 
national security and it is our duty and privilege as human beings.”90 Acheson would 
also take care to alert foreign news correspondents beforehand.9 These were trial runs to 
gauge public reaction to a program that would only entail more sacrifice on the part of 
Americans -  the same voters who had just recently expressed their frustration in 
November. Acheson, the Statesman, had now turned salesman and crusader in the cause 
of “one of the greatest and most honorable adventures in history.”92
On June 5th, Secretary Marshall would announce “The Plan” at Harvard’s 
commencement ceremonies. Twenty-four days later, Acheson resigned. He returned to 
private life and to his practice of the law. Yet Acheson did not like being away from 
government. He likened this period away from public life to the withdrawal period 
experienced by a drug addict, a period marked by “anguish and unhappiness.” “Public 
life,” as Acheson described it, “is not only a powerful stimulant but a habit forming 
one.”93
His resignation had been in arrangement since Marshall had taken over as 
Secretary of State (it was only because of Marshall’s personal request of Acheson that
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Acheson remained as long as he did in his position).94 Robert Lovett became Acheson’s 
replacement. Acheson returned to private life and the practice of law ostensibly for the 
purpose of replenishing his dwindling financial reserves, a matter of which he always 
complained. This arrangement was not to his liking.96 His professional connections to 
government work might have been severed, but not his personal ones. Within two weeks 
of his departure, he was nominated by President Truman to be a member of the Hoover 
Commission which was to recommend improvements to government executive 
management (none of its suggestions were ever adopted).97 In October, Truman would 
appoint Acheson to the position of Chairman United States Section of the Permanent 
American-Canadian Defense Board. This appointment was subsequently found to be 
inconsistent with laws that prohibited private citizens from being appointed to any such 
position, if in their capacity as a private citizen they could bring legal action against the 
United States.99
By November 1947, the Committee for the Marshall Plan, a lobbying group intent 
on getting the Marshall Plan adopted, occupied most of Acheson’s time.100 He was a 
member of the executive board, but even more important, he was one of the group’s 
founders “calling for timely and effective American aid for devastated Europe.”101 
Acheson appeared in cities throughout the United States, such as San Francisco, 
Minneapolis, and Atlantic City, speaking on behalf of the program and the necessity for 
its adoption. He also appeared on radio discussion panels as an advocate of assistance for 
Europe. In these presentations, Acheson struck a different pose in his attitude toward 
Russia.103
The great humanitarian effort was beginning to take on a more adversarial tone as 
regards Russian intentions. A more confrontational approach began to be pursued by the 
United States. Passage of a bill for European assistance was not only the humane thing to 
be done, but also something crucial to America’s national security interest. The 
Committee’s campaign of European recovery was now being interpreted in terms of 
world peace threatened by Soviet expansionism and domination -  “We live in dangerous 
times because of the decisions of another power.”104 He would engage the politics of fear 
to get his point across. Acheson testified before Senate committees in support of the 
resolution for European aid, stating that “this is the hour of decision; this is the time in 
which we cannot falter.”105 Acheson always deplored demagoguery and he was close to 
the boundary here.106
107The Foreign Assistance Act was signed by President Truman in April 1948.
The following day, the President asked Acheson if he would be the program’s 
administrator. Acheson declined the request, suggesting Paul Hoffman in his stead. 
Hoffmann accepted, and was readily accepted by the Republicans who would vote for the 
program’s funding.108 The Presidential election campaigns were beginning in earnest 
shortly after this resolution had passed, and since nothing focused political attention more 
than this quadrennial event and was usually at the expense of all other government 
business. That was unless, of course, that business may have had a direct bearing on the 
race for President.
At this time (August 1948), the Alger Hiss case would begin to make its way 
through history, and Acheson would be inextricably linked to the matter. Alger Hiss had 
been accused of spying for the Soviet Union while employed by the United States 
Department of State. He had allegedly used his position to access vital information
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109which he then turned over to the Soviets. Hiss had denied the accusation, but was 
subsequently found guilty of a lesser charge of perjury in this matter and sentenced to 
five years imprisonment.110 Acheson’s involvement in the case was more than a little 
circumstantial, and he made his part worse by stating, during his confirmation hearings in 
January 1949, that Alger Hiss was his friend, and that he would not turn his back on 
him.111 The attacks on Acheson because of his association with Hiss cannot be 
minimized. Demand was made for his dismissal from government service, and although 
this would never be brought to that conclusion, Acheson found that he had been 
“discredited, his reputation [had been] damaged, and his political usefulness [had been]
112greatly damaged.”
The incident did have another effect: it created an atmosphere of fear that was 
difficult to separate from the business at hand. It forced people, especially those in 
government, to harden themselves against accusations of being communist sympathizers. 
Actions and policies would have to have to bear the anti-communist imprimatur, or risk 
rejection, along with their authors. The popular mood did not entertain cordial relations 
with countries whose ideological predilections were antithetical to those of the United 
States. Coexistence was also a questionable position to advocate. Fear and hysteria 
would be the tools of Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin (again pulling Acheson into 
a domestic crisis in which he did little but make his part worse), but that is beyond this 
story.
The United States presidential campaign and election of 1948 was at best a grim 
prospect for Harry S. Truman, his chance for success seemed very remote. Overcoming 
an intraparty fight with the Dixiecrats to become the Democratic Party candidate, it was 
an uphill battle against the Republican nominee, Thomas Dewey. In a close election, 
which had been all but conceded to Dewey by all the major polling companies (and not a 
few newspapers even after the fact), Truman won by a narrow margin.114 This was an 
especially surprising victory after the 1946 mid-term elections in which the Democrats 
had suffered a devastating defeat. Following this win, President Truman set about 
reorganizing his Cabinet. Dean Acheson was his choice to replace George C. Marshall as 
Secretary of State.115 The reason Dean Acheson was selected over other prominent 
candidates (e.g. Chief Justice Fred Vinson; United States Ambassador to Great Britain, 
Lewis Douglas)116 was explained later by Acheson himself:
President Truman’s policies had been evolved with the help of two 
secretaries of state. I had served them both as their Under Secretary and 
knew something of the circumstances and problems the Presidents actions 
had been designed to meet and the need for steadiness and continuity.. .to 
be frank, forthright and vigorous in counsel; energetic and loyal in 
accepting decisions and carrying them out.117
Domestic issues tend to dominate national politics and elections. Foreign policy, 
important though it may be, is considered in terms of its impact on domestic tranquility, 
and how it comports with the democratic ideals of the republic. As a direct result, most 
foreign policy activity during these times finds itself relegated to the background. This 
was the case effecting ongoing international negotiations/discussions as to an Atlantic 
security pact among Western European countries with an eye to involving the United
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States. Talks for establishing an Atlantic mutual defense organization had been well
119under way by the time Dean Acheson was chosen and confirmed as Secretary of State. 
However, generally speaking, possible involvement of the United States was not a widely 
debated issue.120 The Department of State and the Pentagon discussed amongst 
themselves, and their European counterparts, the role the United States could play in such 
a group. In point of fact, there was really little (public) progress made in the 
development of such a pact beyond what had been proposed at/by the Brussels Pact in the 
spring of 1948, a meeting in which the United States played no official role, but did 
endorse the action.
The United Kingdom, France, and the Benelux countries had met at Brussels and 
agreed that some sort of alliance was necessary to ensure against “any policy of 
aggression” that might be generated by another against one of its members. This was 
to be a military mutual assistance pact, and although Germany was the only nation 
mentioned as a possible source of aggression in the agreement itself, it was clearly 
intended to counter Russian policy. Just as obvious as this tacit challenge to Russia’s 
aggressive expansionism, was the inability of this group to offer any real resistance 
without the participation of the United States. There was always the United Nations as a 
possible counterweight to Russian incursions, but the agreement at Brussels reflected 
little confidence in the former’s ability to effectively deal with the matter of security. 
Acheson set about immediately to continue discussions for U.S. inclusion in this mutual 
security pact. There were several hurdles he would have to clear to see the plan to 
adoption, but he was no stranger to the process.
It is important to note that Acheson never acted without Truman’s acquiescence, 
if not beforehand then immediately thereafter; Acheson always kept his boss apprised of 
his doings, and in policy matters, Acheson was always careful that he reflected what the 
President would need. Both the President’s and Acheson’s public pronouncements on 
foreign policy were coordinated to avoid the appearance of contradiction, and the 
President was not hesitant to defer to his Secretary for clarification and explication of 
State Department programs. It was no different when it came time to involving the 
United States in the Atlantic treaty pact.124
Acheson knew from his experience that it was always better to be too prepared
than otherwise, and upon becoming secretary, he would follow this course of action as
regards the Atlantic pact. He continued negotiations in private (not in secret) until the
moot points began to emerge. The first points to be overcome had to do with the
language and intent of the proposed pact. The intent, “a program of mutual protection,”
was the easy part, but Acheson had to reconcile the language of the agreement with
Constitutional restrictions and requirements and balance this with the security needs and
assurances sought by the other signatories. The language of the agreement took
somewhat longer to work out because of the numerous agendas which had to be serviced.
Basically, the Brussels pact was a reformulation of the treaty of Rio de Janeiro (translated
into a European framework) to which the United States was already a signatory, and so
126that provided Acheson with a working framework.
The Rio Pact between the United States and its western hemispheric allies was 
concluded in 1947, pledging, among other things, mutual support in the event of attack, 
and, as mentioned above in this article, the Rio Pact served as a template for the soon to 
be approved North Atlantic Treaty’s article #5. Under Acheson, certain areas of foreign
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diplomacy suffered from benign neglect (the sub-continent of Asia, Africa), but the Latin 
Americas (Central, South, and Caribbean) were victims of criminal neglect. Russia had 
evidenced little interest in the area, and this presented no threat to United States 
security. Consequently, very little American economic, political, or military aid was 
extended to Latin America. But Acheson’s attitude toward these countries and their 
peoples leaves little to his credit. It can at best be said that he did not allow them to be 
put in harm’s way.
Articles #3, #5, and #9 in the final pact proved the most troublesome for 
Acheson’s campaign to have the pact attain congressional approval. To overcome these 
difficulties, Acheson made a number of assurances to the Senate Committee. Article #3 
indicated the development and maintenance of individual and collective capacity for 
armed resistance.129 Acheson stressed that the “mutual aid” called for in this particular 
article meant that the country would not be expected to supply an exorbitant amount of 
resources (e.g., medical supplies, “manpower, productive capacity, military equipment, 
etc.”). Rather, the United States would only have to contribute such resources at 
“reasonable” levels, levels which were consistent with its geographic location and 
resources.”130 When queried as to whether this would involve the placement of U.S. 
troops in Europe, Acheson somewhat disingenuously replied “no.” However, when that 
possibility did become a reality and he was confronted about it, Acheson would still 
refuse to accept it as his fault.131
Article #5 stipulated that an armed attack against one or more member countries 
in Europe or North America was to be considered an attack against all member nations, 
and, as consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, which recognized the right to 
individual or collective self-defense, member nations could take such action as deemed 
necessary to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area, to include the 
use of armed force.132 Curiously it was the insertion of this last phrase, “to include the 
use of armed force,” which won Senate support of the article.
Article #9 established and described the composition of the NATO council, which 
would have the authority to establish a defense committee whose purpose was to 
implement articles #3 and #5.133 Furthermore, “each government... [would remain].. .the 
judge of what actions it should take in the fulfillment of this treaty.”134 This article was 
interpreted by Acheson (to Congressional representatives) as meaning any declaration of 
war would be subject to approval (as was consistent with the United States constitution). 
In this way, the prerogatives of the Congress would not be usurped.135 In closing his 
talks with the Senate Committee, Acheson stressed the following:
The essential purpose of the treaty is to fortify and preserve this common 
way of life. It is designed to contribute to this maintenance of peace by 
making clear in advance the determination of the parties resolutely and 
collectively to resist armed attack on any of them. It is further designed to 
contribute to the stability and well-being of the member nations by 
removing the haunting sense of insecurity and enabling then to plan and 
work with confidence in the future. Finally, it is designed to provide the 
basis for effective collective action to restore and maintain the security of 
the North Atlantic area if an armed attack should occur.136
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“Why.. .entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, 
rivalship, interest, humor or caprice?”137-  the foundation of America’s isolationism as 
expressed by George Washington, and the hallmark of United States foreign policy since 
the foundation of the Republic was gently pushed aside in April 1949. The United States 
was now the economic and military leader of the Western powers. From its beginnings 
as a handful of nations at the Western periphery of Europe who had gathered at Brussels 
to form their mutual assistance pact, Acheson (not alone of course) had translated the 
idea into an organization second to none in power and influence. The threat to 
international stability was not lessened by the establishment of NATO, but rather, 
substantially increased. The reaction from Russia was as expected negative and this new 
reality (i.e., NATO) was viewed as but a temporary impediment to Soviet dedication to 
the spread of communism. It may very well have been Acheson’s intention to build a 
better peace (and in the long term that is what happened), but it was hardly evident at this 
point in time. Acheson had helped craft the ultimate “situation of strength” for the 
United States. He had demonstrated the United States’ willingness to back up its 
words with action (armed action armed if that was necessary) as well as to preserve peace 
and ensure freedom. In doing this, Acheson helped America abandon its tradition of 
isolationism:
The outside world, as it actually existed, was grim and forbidding with 
heavy burdens and responsibilities attached to power. On the other side 
contrasting with it, was the memory of the world as it had been, and as one 
wished it might be. Between must lie error and fault.
Concurrent with the development of the North Atlantic Pact, there had been 
discussions of a Military Aid Program (during Acheson’s hiatus from government 
service) which was to be a supplement to the economic provisions of the Marshall 
Plan.140 This program was consistent with the North Atlantic Pact, but separate from it. 
As Acheson described it, “both [North Atlantic Pact and Military Aid Program] flowed 
from a common source.”141 The object was to establish “a force in Europe that would 
preclude a quick victory by sudden marches, backed by an American capability for 
punishing blows against an aggressor’s home territory.”142 The illusion of resistance was 
to be replaced by a reality, which would in turn be reinforced by U.S. atomic weapons.143 
Acheson would see this plan through to its adoption and once again, it would be with the 
stubborn assistance of Senator Vandenberg of Michigan.144 The final Congressional 
approval of the Senate version of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, the base of the 
Military Aid Program having been expanded to include United States military interests in 
Asia, was passed in October of 1949, shortly after the Soviet Union tested its first atomic 
bomb.145
With calm deliberation, Acheson pursued a foreign policy which was gradually 
becoming more militant. He had grown the North Atlantic pact to almost triple its 
original membership and not without hard bargaining. American economic and 
technological support was prioritized, members of NATO receiving first consideration, 
and then nonmembers. If there was anything left, thus, the Scandinavian (Norway) 
countries were brought into line. Potential members, as identified by the United States, 
could choose whatever course of action they deemed in their best interest. However,
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Acheson felt obligated to point out to these countries the benefits and consequences 
which were attendant upon declining the invitation.146 It soon became apparent to non- 
aligned nations that a decision would have to be made as to what would and who could 
insure national viability. Neutrality would not be acceptable in this ever polarized 
atmosphere.
However, as Acheson consolidated his diplomatic holdings, he was moving 
inexorably toward a position in which his options were becoming more and more limited. 
The conditions he was preparing would begin to dictate his course of action. In an 
inevitable slide to the right, he would find it difficult to change direction. His foreign 
policy became less flexible and more predictable. Acheson came to believe that there 
was only so much that could be done from a defensive posture, and began to anticipate, 
prepare for, and initiate foreign policy offensives. In Acheson’s mind, a reactionary 
foreign policy which was always on the defensive could not be effective. In addition, 
such policy appeared weak. As a result, such policy would only serve to work to the 
Soviets’ advantage.
By the close of 1949, the intensity of the Cold War had drawn the lines of conflict 
as they would remain for its duration. The classic cold war policies and strategies of the 
competing halves would be set firmly in place during this time. The constant probing by 
the Soviet Union at what appeared to be weak spots in the Western alliance, and the 
counterthrust would be the leitmotif of the war’s continuation. The West would increase 
political and diplomatic pressure by and through any means it could take advantage of 
while the Kremlin would seek to create doubt and disunity among the western allies. 
There was another element added to this international tension: the possibility of mutual 
annihilation by means of atomic weapons.147 That Russia would at some point enter the 
atomic age was never in doubt, but it was anticipated that the United States would retain 
its exclusive access to this technology for some years to come. Russia’s successful atom 
bomb test, coupled with the communist takeover of China, by Mao Zedong, ended the
148year 1949 badly for Acheson and the West.
At this time, Western confidence was shaken. In the event of armed conflict 
between East and West, West Europeans and Americans never doubted that the battle 
would be nearly over before the West could mount any effective defense. However, they 
were reasonably certain that they would eventually survive and be able to fight on.
United States’s atomic weaponry had been seen as providing the time necessary for the 
West to mobilize a defense. Yet this frame of mind had been altered when it became 
clear that Russia could counter an attack with atomic weapons of its own. Such a 
reality negated the tactical edge of Russia’s rivals. The strategy whereby Russian 
advances could be contained now took on a much different appearance and required 
immediate attention. In January 1950, President Truman instructed the State Department 
(Acheson as Secretary of State) and the Department of Defense (Louis Johnson as 
Secretary) to assess this atomic threat and make policy recommendations per the National 
Security Council.150
The policy paper which would eventually emerge was known as NSC-68. Its 
primary author was Paul Nitze, Director of Policy Planning in the State Department, but 
the final product was the essential Acheson.151 Acheson oversaw and controlled the ideas 
which would or would not be included in the document from the beginning of the process 
to its final presentation for President Truman’s consideration. Specifically, the President
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was seeking an assessment of Soviet capabilities in managing fissionable materials and 
with possible Russian development of thermonuclear devices. The latter was especially 
important because the United States was on the verge of developing its own hydrogen 
bomb, a thermonuclear weapon, and beside the moral implications involved in the debate 
over development, was the feasibility of diverting the scarce and essential fissionable 
materials toward this program, at the expense of atomic armament production. Acheson 
addressed these concerns, but he also saw the opportunity to 
broaden the scope of the policy’s application.
The mechanism of the National Security Council was a rather new innovation 
itself, having only been established by means of the National Security Act in 1947. Yet 
the Council’s introduction as a consultative body was not well received by either the 
President or his Secretary of State. Until the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, Truman 
rarely attended any of its meetings, believing the Council was only a stalking horse for 
congressional legislators who had no business in this area. Likewise, Acheson was wary 
of the Council and considered it a threat to the mission of the State Department. As 
such, he considered it a nuisance. Yet he also recognized that to abandon the Council to 
its own devices would merely create more problems than the bureaucrat in Acheson 
would allow. He would not debate the problem of the Security Council, but as George 
Marshall would have directed, he managed it.
As information, viewpoints, assessments, recommendations were being assembled 
and weighed as to their relevance and efficacy, it became apparent within the State 
Department itself that there existed a philosophical divide. George Kennan (former 
Director of the Policy Planning staff) and Charles Bohlen argued for a much more 
abstruse approach than Acheson thought practical.154 As a result, Acheson rejected their 
approach. In the final version of NSC-68, the subject of the Soviet Union’s atomic 
capabilities was linked to an overarching armaments plan which would stand in direct 
opposition to any military threat from the Kremlin. It was a commitment by the United 
States to prepare itself and to use any means necessary to protect its national security and 
that of its allies from overt or covert communist incursions. This would include the use 
of conventional and atomic weapons. Acheson could see the adoption of this policy in its 
wider application to American foreign diplomacy i.e., a Western rearmament program 
able to withstand any onslaught from the east. As Acheson construed it, “the purpose of 
NSC-68 was to so bludgeon the mass mind o f  ‘top government’ that not only could the 
President make a decision but that the decision be carried out.155
The final policy proposal (NSC-68) did not include any cost estimates, but this 
was by design. Acheson had purposefully omitted this particular point.156 Acheson 
knew that such military rehabilitation and rearmament would be costly and would require 
approximately fifty billion dollars a year into the foreseeable future. After having 
consulted knowledgeable sources, he considered the figure “well within [the] national 
economic capacity.”157 This expenditure he felt was vital to continued national security, 
but he saw that to have included cost estimates in the policy proposal would have worked 
against its adoption. Acheson believed that before the decision could be made to adopt 
the policy “in principle” the “mice in the Budget Bureau will nibble to death the will to 
decide.”158
Methodically, the paper made and established its points. In its every word, 
phrase, and paragraph Acheson’s voice rang loud and clear. Negotiation with the Soviet
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Union was steeply discounted and written off as a tool whereby Russia prolonged a 
problem not to search for resolution, but to see if any advantage was to be gained. As the 
document stressed, the Kremlin was not interested in words and thus, only action could 
command the Soviet Union’s attention and respect. Action reaffirmed resolve, anything 
less reflected weakness. Strong foreign policy would require military strength. 
Furthermore, the evidence of military strength and the will to use it would ensure the 
support of the United States’ allies. Essentially, NSC-68 laid out the ultimate 
containment strategy for it was purposed to be applied to Europe, Asia, Africa, as well as 
all of the Americas.159
As NSC-68 made clear, there were no gray areas to be considered at this time; 
everything was in black and white: democracy versus totalitarianism, freedom versus 
slavery, civilization versus annihilation. “Containment” as a continuing policy was 
considered an effective strategy with which to counter Soviet expansionism, and one that 
lent itself to the highly cherished American ideals of fairness and freedom. As 
implemented, this policy sought change just short of armed conflict. This policy also 
relied heavily on two other elements: time and military strength. Time allowed for 
reflection and reconsideration and also allowed for the seeds of self-destruction to take 
hold. On the other hand, military strength was “in effect a policy of calculated and 
gradual coercion.”160 Containment provided not only the opportunity for negotiation, but 
also a source of pressure on the Kremlin to yield its hardened positions. The two 
alternative policy extremes of isolationism and preventive war were dismissed as 
untenable. The former was rejected because it failed to provide safeguards in the event of 
attack, and the latter was rejected because it was inconsistent and incompatible with 
American sensibilities -  it would have been “morally corrosive” in the eyes of 
Americans.161
For the authors of NSC-68, there was no doubt that the United States and its allies 
had the resources, the capital, and the skills necessary to meet the challenge posed by the 
Soviet Union. However, the authors also recognized that what was needed most was the 
will to act with a unity of purpose. Acheson was forever bedeviled by liberals who 
claimed that the only real threat emanated from weaknesses in the western societal, 
political, and economic structures of Europe. Yet Acheson did not let himself be swayed 
by the opposition. He remained firm in his position that the United States would be the 
deciding factor in any contest of wills.
Political, economic, and military preparedness for an anticipated confrontation 
with Russia was the end product of NSC-68. Armed conflict was not sought, nor was 
negotiation to be ignored in an effort to preserve the peace, but all had to stand in 
readiness for an impending clash -  if it was ever to come between the United States/its 
allies and the Soviet Union. If the United States and its allies were to survive as free 
liberal democracies, then proactive positions had to be adopted. All of this had to be 
done “to assure the integrity and vitality of our free society.”162 Nothing less than a rapid 
build up of these elements (political, economic, and military) would ensure the free world 
remained free. Every, and all, resource(s) available to the United States and its allies had 
to be mobilized “to reduce the power and influence of the Kremlin inside the Soviet 
Union and other areas under its control.” The stockpiling of atomic weaponry (and 
thermonuclear devices if they were proven to be effective) would proceed along with 
conventional weapons rearmament build-up for two reasons. The first reason was that it
The Histories, Volume 9, Number 2 39
was to be reasonably expected that Russia would adopt a similar program. The second 
reason was that the ever changing demands of armed conflict might require such 
weapons.
The NSC-68 document had been designed to be a collaborative effort, as directed 
by President Truman, undertaken by the Department of State and the Department of 
Defense. And for all intents and purposes, this was what the document was. Nearing 
completion of the work, a meeting was arranged with the respective staffs and Secretaries 
to go over the draft. However, when it came time to review the recommendation in its 
final stages before presentation, the Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson, took exception 
to the entire proceeding. He claimed that the project had been conducted without either 
his knowledge or input and refused to cooperate any further in the discussions. After a 
heated exchange with Acheson, Johnson left. In his future writings, Acheson would 
remark, “he [Johnson] was mentally ill...His conduct became too outrageous...some 
years later he underwent a brain operation.”164 A telephone call from President Truman 
settled the matter once and for all. Johnson signed off on the NSC-68 document when it 
was completed. The following September, Johnson was dismissed from his position as 
Defense Secretary.165
Once the NSC-68 document was completed, Acheson knew that such a plan had 
to be brought to the public’s attention if it was to receive support because it would require 
unity and continued sacrifice if it was to be effective. In the final “Notes” appended to 
NSC-68, Acheson had the last word. He listed seven points that he believed if adhered to 
by the Soviets might avert an impending crisis. These conditions, if they were met by the 
Kremlin, could result in “coexistence in reasonable security.” Acheson did make parts of 
this policy a matter for public discussion and consideration in a number of different 
venues prior to its being given over to Truman in April of 1950, the same strategy he had 
employed with the Marshall Plan in 1947-1948.
Appearing as a guest speaker at the University of California, Berkeley, on March 
16, 1950, Acheson delivered an address titled “Tensions between the United States and 
the Soviet Union.” In this speech, he iterated the (aforementioned) seven conditions 
which if met by the Soviet Union could lessen the tensions between the two countries. 
First, there must be developed a definition of terms of peace in relation to final settlement 
with former enemies, Germany, Austria, and Japan. Specifically, these terms had to 
allow for these former enemy countries to once again enter into the international 
community as autonomous, self-governing units. These countries could not be allowed to 
become mere satellites of the Soviet Union. Second, force should be renounced by the 
Russian authorities as a means of dominating “satellite” countries. Third, the Russians 
should put an end to their obstructionist tactics within the United Nations and allow the 
decision making process among the various member countries to go on undisturbed. This 
meant that the representatives of the Soviet Union in the United Nations had to stop 
boycotting and walking out during UN meetings. Fourth, the Soviet Union should join 
with the United States in making arrangements for the control of atomic weapons. Fifth, 
the Russians should cease all attempts to undermine established governments throughout 
the world. Sixth, the Soviet Union should take reasonable care to insure the proper 
treatment of diplomatic representatives. Seventh, Soviet leaders should refrain from 
systematically distorting to their own peoples the picture of the world outside of their 
own borders. In particular, the Soviets’ negative propaganda in reference to the United
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States had to be discontinued. In closing his speech, Acheson urged his audience to 
recognize the importance of following through with such proactive foreign policy 
measures:
The times call for a total diplomacy equal to the task of defense against 
Soviet expansion and to the task of building the kind of world in which 
our way of life can flourish. We must continue to press ahead with the 
building of a free world which is strong in its faith and in its material 
progress. The alternative is to allow the free nations to succumb one by 
one to the erosive and encroaching processes of Soviet expansion.166
As Acheson recorded it, NSC-68 became national policy on April 25, 1950. 
However, “little did Acheson imagine that the very kind of aggression against which 
NSC-68 was designed to function would make possible its implementation.” The 
impetus for the policy’s adoption was supplied by the communists themselves, in the 
form of the Korean conflict which began in June 1950.168
In referring to Korea, another point in reference to Acheson’s foreign policy 
should be pointed out. In considering the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, NATO, 
NSC-68, and the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, it is hard to dispute the fact that 
Acheson’s policies (and hence, those of the United States) were “Eurocentric” in the 
main. Though this may be the case, Acheson did in fact have an extensive Asian policy 
program with Japan as the centerpiece. Although Acheson may have been a bit late in 
coming into the game, and that even though he may not have specifically formulated 
Asian policy, Acheson was well aware of the importance of the Asian area and as such, 
he appointed capable assistants to devise appropriate policies.
On many occasions, Acheson had reason to be concerned with developments in 
Asia. One might even speculate that with a little more care and attention to detail, events 
that occurred in that area of the world may have turned out differently. Undoubtedly, 
events in China could not have been drastically effected to turn out otherwise; its civil 
war if concluded with Chiang Kai-Shek the victor still would have been no guarantee of 
stability on the Asian mainland. There was one exception to what might be seen as 
benign neglect in the region and that was Japan.
The cornerstone of Acheson’s Asian policy then was the reconstruction of Japan 
economically, politically, and eventually, militarily -  the reintegration of a “stabilized” 
Asian state in alliance with the United States. In January 1950, Acheson’s speech to the 
National Press Club detailed the United States “Pacific Defense Perimeter” stretching 
from Ryukyus to the Philippines. In this chain of containment, Japan would be of 
primary importance. Unfortunately, in this speech Acheson excluded South Korea 
from this perimeter. Whether the omission of South Korea in Acheson’s speech was a 
cue to the communists (in North Korea/China/Soviet Union) that South Korea would not 
be contested and therefore it would be easy to invade, is a matter that is still being 
debated among historians.
Returning to the story of NSC-68, it should be noted that there are no direct 
references to specific parts of the NSC-68 document by Acheson, because at the time of 
his death in 1971 the document had still not been declassified and therefore, comment on 
its contents was restricted. Yet this does not necessarily mean that Dean Acheson was 
completely silent on the issue of NSC-68. Flash forward to 1958 when Acheson
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published a small tome titled Power and Diplomacy. Upon reviewing this work, the 
word similitude immediately would come to mind. The two works {Power and 
Diplomacy and NSC-68) differed substantially in terms of style. In his book, Acheson 
indulged his preference for history and literature, whereas the authors of NSC-68 (of 
whom Acheson was one) came with more of an industrial/military complex approach. 
Although there was eight years of events separating the two works, this time proved 
useful because it provided Acheson with an opportunity to reflect on the efficacy of 
strategies, policies, and programs which he had helped initiate while serving in the State 
Department. Differences aside, the two works, when taken together, show a strong 
connection to one another, a connection which speaks to Acheson’s views on appropriate 
foreign policy for the United States.
In the life and political career of Dean Acheson, the story that is told is one of 
unflagging dedication to safeguarding the interests of the United States. The strategies he 
employed, the motivations for his actions, the resultant policies, and the far-reaching 
outcomes of his decisions can best be assessed through his involvement in the 
formulation of several key pieces of American foreign policy: the Truman Doctrine, the 
Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and National Security 
Council-68. The Mutual Defense Assistance Program may also be added to this list as 
evidence of Acheson’s involvement and influence on the development of United States 
foreign policy.
The programs that Acheson helped create during the years from 1947 to 1950 are 
some of the most significant ones to occur during the Cold War period when the United 
States and the Soviet Union were engaged in a tense, prolonged confrontation in which 
their ideas and ideals were tested and re-tested. Although in the end the United States 
would prove victorious in this clash of world powers, such a triumph was not 
preordained. To overcome their communist enemy, the United States had to engage in a 
process of policy making which required a significant amount of time and commitment. 
Acheson would be at the forefront of these policy changes, guiding and leading America 
in its move from a foreign policy position of benign coexistence to aggressive 
containment.
While working in the State Department, Acheson personally initiated, directed, 
and introduced policies. When not in the employ of the United States government, 
Acheson was actively engaged in doing whatever his part demanded to ensure that 
programs were carried forward. In many instances, his part demanded that he appear 
before Congressional committees in support of policies, such as the Marshall Plan and 
NATO, to ensure their adoption.
In reflecting upon Acheson’s contributions to American foreign policy, one sees 
that his policies have served his country’s needs well. The path taken in these instances 
were never easy or simple ones, and Acheson recognized that:
The road to freedom and to peace which I have pictured is a hard one. The 
times in which we live must be painted in the somber values of 
Rembrandt. The background is dark, the shadows deep. Outlines are 
obscure. The central point, however, glows with light; and, though it often 
brings out the glint of steel. It touches colors of unimaginable beauty. For
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us, that central point is the growing unity of free men the world over. This
170is our shaft of light, our hope, and our promise.
After such a statement, who could not respect such a man and the work he engaged in for 
the United States?
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IV
The Women’s Christian Temperance Union: 
Demanding Rights and Oppressing Immigrants 
By Julia Walsh ‘12
Alcohol. This lone word, one of many words in the English language, can stir up 
multiple emotions, stories, and some (maybe hazy) memories. The culture of drinking in 
America differs greatly from the drinking culture in many of our European counterparts. 
While the Italians serve wine with lunch and dinner, the Germans take pride in their 
biergartens and Oktoberfest. The Irish are also known for their love of the pint or a wee 
bit of whisky, while the French enjoy alcohol to complement their fine cuisine. In 
America, those under twenty-one years of age are forbidden to consume alcohol or even 
be in the presence of it. In America, you can serve your country in the military at age 
eighteen, but you cannot enter a bar when you return home. In America, we had the 
temperance movement and prohibition in which both the consumption and sale of 
alcoholic beverages were illegal.
In a nation of immigrants, the temperance movement sought to ban a crucial 
aspect of foreign cultures—alcohol—during the first Gilded Age. This era in American 
history saw a rise in immigration as well as female participation in social issues on a 
larger scale. The latter grew in discussing and changing public policy, particularly 
through the Women’s Christian Temperance Union; these middle-class Protestant ladies 
associated alcohol with abusive husbands, broken families, and heathen immigrants. 
Thus, their desire to promote temperance stemmed from the perceived need to uphold the 
moral fiber of the nation beyond their role in the cult of domesticity. But what also began 
to rise in America during the Gilded Age were class distinctions. A nouveau riche 
replaced old money. A middle class began to bloom. And a lower class of immigrants 
crammed into cities to find work. Therefore, the temperance movement also stemmed 
from a desire of the middle and upper class to tame and control the lower immigrant 
class; they were able to use nativist fears and stereotypes to popularize temperance and 
prohibition. The ramifications of the WCTU’s actions still permeate our country today.
Abstaining from alcohol and the idea of temperance were not new phenomena to 
the Gilded Age. In colonial days, drinking was looked at with a completely different 
mentality. Alcohol was safer to drink than water because water could often be 
contaminated; doctors prescribed it as medicine for all sorts of ailments or as to pain 
relievers and relaxants.1 Don Cahalan, a late professor for the University of California at
1 Don Cahalan. Understanding America’s Drinking Problem: How to Combat the Hazards of Alcohol. (San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1987), 24.
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Berkeley’s School of Public Health, also acknowledged that Puritans were not supporters 
of prohibition as early settlers because they themselves enjoyed drinking. As soon as they 
landed, they started “making beer and hard cider and wine from native fruits and 
berries.”2 However, as the 1700s progressed, Cahalan noted that some settlers began to 
advocate prohibition of distilling.3 Regulation of taverns even began to occur through 
taxes on alcoholic beverages as early as the 1600s.
Thus this is the beginning of America’s complicated relationship with drinking. 
Once the colonists became their own separate nation, talks of temperance continued in 
the pre-Gilded Age, antebellum period. In 1833, the American Temperance Society, 
stated alcohol was not “needful, or useful.” Rather, it caused bodily harm and spiritual 
corruption.4 At this time, the moral implications surrounding alcoholic consumption 
began to provide the primary drive for temperance and prohibition.
Pre-Gilded Age immigrants, especially the Irish and Germans, caused the average 
American (the white Protestant) to take a more impassioned stance on alcoholic 
abstinence which Cahalan notes began around 1850.5 The Irish and Germans were 
particularly fond of their drink, and anti-Catholic nativists perceived these urban wage 
laborers as a major threat to the country’s moral fiber. Stephen Crane’s Maggie: A Girl of 
the Streets presents the stereotype of the Irish as rowdy, proud, violent drunkards. 
According to author Holly Berkley Fletcher, citizens saw the influx of immigrants to be 
invaders in their native land.6 The 1840s saw increased “efforts to achieve legislation 
governing the sale and use of alcohol,”7 states sociologist Joseph R. Gusfield. During this 
time, the Irish were pouring into the country to escape the destruction of the great Potato 
Famine; the Germans entered in order to find political and economic stability.8 Both 
groups largely diversified the urban population, and both cultures placed central 
importance on tavern life.9 Americans did not understand nor attempt to understand the 
Irish and German cultures of alcoholic consumption and thus sought to eradicate it 
simply because it was “un-American.”
Religious ideas also contributed a great deal to the temperance movement of the 
1820s and 30s and the later Gilded Age. Gusfield observes that this time period ushered 
in the “definition of the drinker as an object of social shame.”10 He writes, “Awareness in 
the growth in temperance organization in this period was sparked by the conversion of 
drinking men to abstinence under the stimulus of evangelical revivalism.”11 Indeed, many 
early leaders of the movement were Protestants who converted other Protestants. For 
example, the American Temperance society in 1826 saw its main leaders hail from
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid. 26
4 Ibid. 27
5Ibid. 28
6 Holly Berkley Fletcher. Gender and the American Temperance Movement of the Nineteenth Century. 
(New York: Routledge, 2008), 68-9.
Joseph R. Gusfield, “Moral Passage: The Symbolic Process in Public Designation of Deviance,” in The 
Collective Definition of Deviance, ed. F. James Davis and Richard Stivers. (New York: The Free Press, 
1975), 94.
8 Ushistory.org, “Irish and German Immigration,” US History Online Textbook, 
http://www.ushistory.org/us/25f.asp.
9 Gusfield, “Moral Passage...” 94.
10 Ibid. 92.
Ibid.li
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Presbyterian ministry.12 Ministers were able to use guilt and the promise of the salvation 
in order to curb alcohol consumption within their flock.13
Another crucial period in American history overlapped with the desire for a dry 
nation—the American Civil War. According to Fletcher, “... [consumption of lager beer 
in 1865 was double what it had been fifteen years before and these numbers continued to 
climb through the end of the century...” 14 She also argues that post-Civil War, 
temperance became “an outwardly focus for American Society”15 which united once 
divided Americans.
Post-Civil War, immigration continued and included many Eastern Europeans in 
addition to the Irish and Germans. Many traditional Americans viewed them as a threat to 
their way of life. (However, these Americans typically failed to realize their own history 
of immigration which included depriving Native Americans of their land and rights.)
They did not speak English. They were dirty and poor. And they drank a lot. According 
to Richard Stivers in the introduction of The Collective Definition o f Deviance, “[T]he 
American Temperance Movement...was less interested in preventing drinking than in 
asserting the cultural superiority of a native, Protestant, rural, non-drinking life-style over 
the immigrant, Catholic, drinking life-style.”16 This cultural clash made another divide in 
an already divided nation. According to Fletcher, the immigrant fear existed in the 
antebellum period but became all the more prevalent after the war in the Gilded Age 
“with the political organization of the liquor industry and political exploitation of 
immigrant communities particularly in cities.”17 Upton Sinclair exemplified this idea in 
his work The Jungle (1905). The protagonist, Jurgis, must buy a drink in order to get a 
free meal because his survival depends on it.
The question now lies in what role women played in this debate. Eventually, they 
began to exert a larger role in the movement and expand their influence beyond the cult 
of domesticity, because alcohol use and abuse by men affected the lives of countless 
mothers and children. The National Women’s Christian Temperance Union, founded in 
1874, became “the first women’s mass movement in history” 8 and “the modem world’s 
first large-scale, nonviolent protest movement” states Edward Behr.19 *Comprised mostly 
of middle-class women who “wanted to better the working class economically, socially, 
and morally—even against its wish and inclination,” the temperance movement allowed 
them to vocalize their opinions and springboard their demand for more rights in 
American politics without consideration for their new countrymen.
These women felt passionate in their desire to influence society, partly because of 
their religious devotion. While men often considered women to be the weaker and more
12 Joseph R. Gusfield, “Status Conflict and the Changing Ideologies of the American Temperance 
Movement,” in The Collective Definition of Deviance, ed. F. James Davis and Richard Stivers. (New York: 
The FreePress, 1975), 222.
13 Gusfield, “Moral Passage...”, 93.
14 Fletcher, 60.
15 Ibid.
16 Richard Stivers, introduction to “Lived Morality and Conceptions of Deviance,” in The Collective 
Definition of Deviance, ed. F. James Davis and Richard Stivers. (New York: The Free Press, 1975), 7.
17 Fletcher, 68.
18 Edward Behr, Prohibition: Thirteen Years that Changed America. (New York: Arcade Publishing, 1996), 
35.
Ibid.
0 Ibid. 46.
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emotional of the two sexes, women viewed themselves as “innately more pious and pure 
than men.”21 Thus, they saw the temperance movement as a moral obligation.
The WCTU also provided a forum for similar minded women to make a 
difference beyond their households by protesting, lobbying, and publicly displaying 
support for alcoholic abstinence, especially for immigrants. With the rise of immigration 
during the Gilded Age, the WCTU targeted them in hopes of improving their economic 
situation. To them, the reason immigrants could not improve their social standing was 
because they were too fond of the drink, a naive assumption that did not take into account 
nativist discrimination; WCTU literature reflects this assumption as Gusfield notes:
Irish and German immigrants were often depicted in the process of reformation. 
Often it was the son or daughter of the immigrant who affected the process of 
reformation through his or her experiences with the WCTU. This type of story 
again presents the idea that the acceptance of temperance is a mode of 
assimilation into middle-class life.22
This phenomenon is not specific to the women’s Christian temperance movement, 
however. Crane’s Maggie: A Girl o f the Streets also stereotypes the Irish and 
demonstrates the inability for Maggie to break the cycle of drunkenness and poverty that 
surrounds her; in The Jungle, Jurgis is saved by socialism and abstinence from alcohol. 
With a strong anti-immigrant sentiment in the nation, the women of the movement saw 
an ever present need to “Americanize” and “Christianize” these foreigners.23 (Ironically, 
these immigrants were often Catholic or some other form of Protestant; the WCTU’s 
need to convert them demonstrates a sense of self-assuming American superiority, not 
unlike the attitude of the Gilded Age nouveau riche.) In addition, the WCTU worked to 
improve other facets of immigrant life besides temperance; the group also supported: 
labor reforms, child labor laws, and monetary contributions for a center to aid incoming 
immigrants at Ellis Island.24 However, the Women’s Christian Temperance Union did 
have “an aggressive nativist strain...during the 1880s and 1890s.”23 By participating in 
these acts, the WCTU thought they could change the immigrants’ drunken ways. But the 
fact that they did not form any strong connections with nativist centered groups testifies 
to the fact that the WCTU was not outwardly discriminatory toward immigrants26; they 
were more interested on imposing their way—the “right way”—on those lowest in 
society.
According to Ray Hutchinson, the end of the 19th century saw the WCTU and
21 Rumi Yasutake. “Transnational Women’s Activism: The Woman’s Christian Temperance Union in 
Japan and the United States,” in Women and Twentieth Century Protestantism, ed. Margaret Lamberts 
Bendroth and Virginia Lieson Brerton. (Chicago: University o f Illinois Press, 2002), 93
22 Joseph R. Gusfield. “Social Structure and Moral Reform: A Study o f the Women’s Christian Temperance 
Union.” Sociology, The Progress o f a Decade: A Collection of Articles. Ed. Seymour Martin Lipset and 
Neil J. Smelser. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961), 596.
23 “Status Conflict...” 230.
24 “Social Structure...” 594-5.
25 “Status Conflict...” 230.
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27“other social movements concerned with the alcohol problem in the United States” shift 
their focus to “prohibition rather than personal abstinence as a solution to the alcohol 
problem.”28 Prohibition was not the only issue pushed to the forefront. By asserting 
themselves in the immigrant experience and pushing temperance/prohibition to the 
forefront of American politics, the WCTU also began to promote women’s rights.
Frances Willard, the second president of the union, can be credited with fusing the fight 
for women’s rights, her first passion, with the fight for temperance. Before helping found 
the WCTU in 1874, Willard served as Dean of Women at Northwestern University. In 
1879, five years after its creation, Willard at age 40, became the President of the WCTU. 
During her tenure in office, she accomplished a great deal for the cause, especially 
because of her “do-everything” policy. This philosophy became the umbrella for other 
women’s related movements within this “powerful political force.”29 As President, she 
“encouraged other women to speak publicly for religious and political causes and in so 
doing push the limits of gender restrictions.”30 Clearly, Willard’s agenda would 
ultimately seek to include women’s rights; after all, this was a group for women run by 
women31 in a society dominated by men. In Willard’s eyes, they more than proved their 
capability to handle other political matters, such as voting. They were the “new 
women”32 of America. Though they valued their roles as mothers and wives,33 the 
WCTU became enamored with the ideals of the Gilded Age (which Henry Adams 
opposed) and liberty. Ironically, the WCTU, in demanding their rights for suffrage, 
suppressed the liberty of other individuals, especially immigrants, to drink what they 
want.
Dynamic and charismatic, Willard sought to achieve both her goals—and not just 
in America. In 1883, she created the World’s Women Christian Temperance Union 
(WWCTU). Chapters were created in countries ranging from England to Japan. The 
notion of a group of women worldwide united for a common cause also demonstrated 
growing American influence in the world. The WWCTU was the first international 
women’s organization; the existence of such a group, founded by Americans, seems to 
have been another way for them to assert a growing sense of self-importance and 
dominance.
But European cultures have always viewed alcohol consumption much 
differently than us. Europe was also not built on the backs of immigrants. Yet, the 
WCTU imposed its American Protestant message on the world without respecting the 
nature of alcohol in the more established realm of European culture and society which 
was also the culture of American immigrants. According to Ian Tyrell, the WWCTU met 
some backlash especially since the European middle class did not perceive the
27 Ray Hutchinson. “Capitalism, Religion, and Reform: The Social History o f Temperance in Harvey, 
Illinois,” in Drinking: Behavior and Belief in Modern History, ed. Susanna Barrows and Robin Room. 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991), 207.
28 Ibid.
29 Christopher Coble. “The Role o f  Young People’s Societies in the Training of Christian Womanhood (and 
Manhood), 1880-1910,” in Women and Twentieth-Century Protestantism, ed. Margaret Lamberts Bendroth 
and Virginia Lieson Brereton. (Chicago: University o f Illinois Press, 2002), 77.
30 Ibid., 77-8.
31 Yasutake, 94.
32 Mattingly, 52.
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consumption of alcoholic beverages as a problem or a sin.34
At home, several commentators, such as Fletcher, claim that Willard worked to 
make the WCTU “more racially inclusive and made greater efforts to reach out to African 
Americans and to immigrants. The WCTU actively tried to include immigrants in their 
work and to counter stereotypes about them.”35 Ruth Bordin states,
The WCTU was not only a mass movement that made substantial contributions to 
both the goals and the accomplishments of the nineteenth-century women’s 
movement; it also widely embraced diverse ethnic, sectional, and racial groups. 
Although small in numbers, the mere presence of blacks, native Americans, and 
immigrants, and Southerners too (who were numerically more important), 
contributed to the Union’s claims to represent American womanhood.36
However, others argue there was not complete inclusion. African American women had 
their own WCTU divisions, separate from white ones. At one point, Ida B. Wells accused 
Willard of changing the WCTU’s anti-lynching stance in order to appease Southern 
supporters.37 In terms of immigrants, the WCTU still viewed immigrant women as a 
means of saving immigrant men from the dangers of the drink.38 The “reformed” men 
could also be manipulated at the polls to legalize the cause.39 (We saw voter manipulation 
with Jurgis.) But as nativism grew in the 1890, Bordin also notes that in Willard’s “last 
address to a national convention she asked that Congress ‘enact a stringent immigration 
law prohibiting the influx into our land of more of the scum of the Old World, until we 
have educated those who are here.’”40 That statement demonstrates that helping 
immigrants adjust to America was not the reason women promoted temperance, but 
rather fear of them and condescension towards them. They were “scum” from the “Old 
World,” and the Gilded Age in America was creating its own world. Representing 
universal womanhood, the WCTU really represented the womanhood of the white 
American Protestant.
In terms of enacting drastic social change for the immigrant classes, the WCTU 
experienced great success, especially because of “the tremendous increase in immigration 
after 1890.”41 Many of them were Catholic and Jewish, who did not “patronize the 
WCTU,”42 and the further growth of cities pushed the temperance issue to the forefront 
of politics.43 The American middle- and upper-classes saw them as an even greater threat. 
In 1883, the nation’s states began to enact temperance laws requiring schools to teach
34 Ian Tyrell. Woman’s World. Woman’s Empire. (Chapel Hill, N.C.: the University o f  North Carolina 
Press, 1991.), 69.
33 Fletcher, 120.
36 Ruth Bordin. Women and Temperance: The Quest for Power and Liberty, 1873-1900. (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1981), 159.
37 Ian Tyrell. “Women and Temperance in International Perspective: The World’s WCTU, 1880s-1920s,” 
in Drinking: Behavior and Belief in Modern History. Ed. Susanna Barrows and Robin Room. (Berkeley, 
CA: University o f  California Press, 1991), 227.
38 Women and Temperance, 86.
39 Gusfield. “Status Conflict...,” 233.
40 Women and Temperance, 87.
41 Gusfield, “Status Conflict...,” 232.
42 Tyrell. “Woman’s Empire...,” 65.
43 Ibid.
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“harmful physical effects of alcohol, narcotics, and stimulants.”44 They also mandated 
that teachers pass “an examination on the effects of alcohol and narcotics,”45 expanding 
their cult of domesticity to incorporate schools. While they considered this quite an 
accomplishment, teachers viewed the laws as an insult. They did not think the WCTU 
should be dictating what they should teach.46 Again, the WCTU imposed their views on 
another group. According to Bordin:
In 1907 the WCTU ceased endorsing textbooks and concentrated thenceforth on 
prize contests, the donation of reference books to school libraries, and 
proselytizing among teachers. But its campaign for coercive temperance 
education had been almost universally successful in the 19th century and was to 
continue as a major force in the first two decades of the 20th... certainly, 
compulsory temperance education was one of the more lasting effects of WCTU 
political activity in the nineteenth century.47 
Behr also notes that the teaching practices of temperance were “demonstrations of little 
scientific value but of startling impact.” The WCTU now wanted to send its message, 
regardless of scientific accuracy, to the youth of the nation. Many of these laws still exist 
today.
The largest “achievement” of the WCTU culminated in 1919 with the ratification 
of the 18th Amendment. The Amendment, which banned the sale and consumption of 
alcohol, went into effect in 1920. According to Gusfield, the Amendment’s passing came 
“at the height of immigrant cultures and at the height of immigrant influx into the United 
States.”49 It was successful only in that it passed. People found ways around the law, such 
as making their own alcohol, operating “speakeasies,” or turning to organized crime. It 
did not eradicate the problem; in some ways it worsened it. Because of its lack of success, 
the 18th amendment was repealed in 1933.
Now in the midst of what some have dubbed the second Gilded Age, the role of 
the WCTU, which actually still exists, may be seen as a trite joke in American society. 
Immigrants are no longer the focus group for temperance reform nor is women’s suffrage 
an issue (though they still advocate for women). The group has no interest, Gusfield says, 
in the “humanitarian reform of the underprivileged. Instead it is an indignation against the 
moderate drinker...The middle-class drinking habits are not only in conflict with WCTU 
norms; they are defections from past standards.”50 The class distinctions between drinkers 
and non-drinkers no longer exist. One example of this attack on the moderate drinker is 
the union’s opposition to the Amethyst Initiative which would lower the drinking age 
from 21 to 18. They see this as a terrible danger to the youth our nation; however, the 
youth (particularly those in college under 21) may feel differently.
44 Women and Temperance, 135-6.
45 Ibid.
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47 Ibid., 138.
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Times are vastly different today for women and for immigrants than they were for 
those of the Gilded Age. Women have suffrage. They have college degrees. They are 
more than just housewives; sometimes they are the breadwinner. Immigrants are no 
longer coming in large droves from Europe; the biggest influx of immigrants is from 
south of the border. Though they are being targeted by nativists for other things, like 
illegally entering the country, smuggling narcotics, and not speaking English, alcohol 
consumption is not one of them. There are not as many slums now either. And workers 
have rights.
The legacy of the WCTU is very much embedded in our culture and seems 
outdated; modern society has a much different outlook on alcohol. It permeates 
advertisements, TV shows, college campuses, and high school woods. Class distinctions 
do not separate who consumes alcohol or how much they drink. The WCTU has only 
complicated matters, especially for college students under the legal drinking age of 21. 
Regardless of the American college students’ feelings, international students under our 
legal drinking age are no longer entitled to a right they have at home. Because of the 
WCTU’s views and activism in the first Gilded Age, alcohol has become taboo and 
rigorously suppressed in some households in the second. This mindset sometimes 
negatively impacts children because once they “fly the nest,” they do not always know 
their alcohol limits or how to drink responsibly, often making several regrettable 
decisions as a result. Again, the WCTU continues to impose what they consider a 
desirable lifestyle, not what is practical in today’s society. Less powerful groups disagree, 
but they are not likely to change the law because it is not a major issue in American 
politics. (Immigration still is, however.)
And so, underage drinkers will still continue to find alcohol any way they can. 
College kids will still buy fake IDs to get into bars. People will still abuse the drink. And 
Europe will still be a place where young adults can be treated like adults and consume 
alcohol as such.
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